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ABSTRACT
This Article offers a novel perspective on the implications of
increasingly autonomous and “black box” algorithms, within the
ramification of algorithmic trading, for the integrity of capital
markets. Artificial intelligence (AI) and particularly its subfield of
machine learning (ML) methods have gained immense popularity
among the great public and achieved tremendous success in many
real-life applications by leading to vast efficiency gains. In the
financial trading domain, ML can augment human capabilities in
price prediction, dynamic portfolio optimization, and other
financial decision-making tasks. However, thanks to constant
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progress in the ML technology, the prospect of increasingly capable
and autonomous agents to delegate operational tasks and even
decision-making is now beyond mere imagination, thus opening up
the possibility for approximating (truly) autonomous trading agents
anytime soon.
Given these spectacular developments, this Article argues that
such autonomous algorithmic traders may involve significant risks
to market integrity, independent from their human experts, thanks
to self-learning capabilities offered by state-of-the-art and
innovative ML methods. Using the proprietary trading industry as
a case study, we explore emerging threats to the application of
established market abuse laws in the event of algorithmic market
abuse, by taking an interdisciplinary stance between financial
regulation, law and economics, and computational finance.
Specifically, our analysis focuses on two emerging market abuse
risks by autonomous algorithms: market manipulation and “tacit”
collusion. We explore their likelihood to arise in global capital
markets and evaluate related social harm as forms of market
failures.
With these new risks in mind, this Article questions the
adequacy of existing regulatory frameworks and enforcement
mechanisms, as well as current legal rules on the governance of
algorithmic trading, to cope with increasingly autonomous and
ubiquitous algorithmic trading systems. We demonstrate how the
“black box” nature of specific ML-powered algorithmic trading
strategies can subvert existing market abuse laws, which are based
upon traditional liability concepts and tests (such as “intent” and
“causation”). We conclude by addressing the shortcomings of the
present legal framework and develop a number of guiding
principles to assist legal and policy reform in the spirit of promoting
and safeguarding market integrity and safety.
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INTRODUCTION

Thanks to artificial intelligence (AI)’s continuous progress, the
sub-field of machine learning (ML) today enables the creation of
increasingly “autonomous AI agents” 1 in many domains. In
finance, algorithmic trading systems (ATSs) have already reached a
level of enormous technological sophistication and a high degree of
system automation.2 AI, and ML methods in particular, allow for
ATSs with increased autonomy to be established.3 While having the
capacity to revolutionize trading as we know it, delegating financial
decision-making to increasingly autonomous and “black box” AI
trading agents can also expose markets to new sources of risk.4
Specifically, this Article explores emerging threats to the safe
application of established legal concepts of liability for market abuse
in dealing with misconducts by increasingly autonomous AI trading
agents, using the proprietary trading industry as a case study. As
we will see, autonomous AI trading could achieve unprecedented
versatility and develop unexpected capabilities beyond what
human experts can reasonably expect. Indeed, thanks to selflearning, AI traders could behave in unpredictable ways, for both
good and evil. As discussed below, these risks include new forms
1
For “autonomous AI agents,” we generally refer to agent systems in
automation technology; this envisions a delimitable (hardware and/or software)
unit with defined goals that the agent strives to achieve through autonomous
behavior and interactions with the environment and other agents. Cf., e.g., Stan
Franklin & Art Graesser, Is It an Agent, or Just a Program?: A Taxonomy for
Autonomous Agents, in Intelligent Agents III: AGENT THEORIES, ARCHITECTURES, AND
LANGUAGES 21, 25 (Jörg P. Müller, Michael J. Wooldridge & Nicholas R. Jennings
eds., 1996) (“An autonomous agent is a system situated within and a part of an
environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its
own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future.”).
2
Michael P. Wellman & Uday Rajan, Ethical Issues for Autonomous Trading
Agents, 27 MINDS & MACHINES 609, 610-11 (2017).
3
See FIN. STABILITY BD., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS
8
(2017)
[hereinafter
FSB],
https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P011117.pdf.
4
Id. at 24-34 (identifying both micro and macro sources of financial stability
risks led by the widespread adoption of AI in the financial services industry). See
also Adriano Koshiyama, Nick Firoozye & Philip Treleaven, Algorithms in Future
Capital Markets: A Survey on AI, ML and Associated Algorithms in Capital Markets, in
OF
ACM
ICAIF
’20
(2020),
PROCEEDINGS
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3383455.3422539 (reviewing the strengths
and weaknesses of certain ML algorithms applied to financial trading and
discussing their future impact on global capital markets).
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of market manipulation and algorithmic “tacit” collusion.5 Notably,
several ethical and legal questions arise when dealing with issues of
liability for algorithms’ misbehavior. 6 Our findings suggest that
AI’s misconduct can ultimately subvert existing prohibitions of
market abuse.
This study contributes to enhancing our
understanding of the risks associated with liability for autonomous
AI decision-making. It thus enriches the scientific debate on AI and
finance, to ultimately inform global regulators when thinking about
innovative regulatory solutions, taking into account the
technology’s specificities. There is indeed a need for a regulatory
paradigm shift favoring increased adaptability vis-à-vis the
challenges posed by a continually evolving technological market
ecosystem,7 to effectively safeguard capital markets’ integrity and
global financial stability.
We proceed as follows. Section II introduces the concept of
autonomous “AI traders” and investigates the technological
potential of their emergence. Subsequently, Section III shows that
such self-learning agents may also learn how to game the system
and engage in manipulative and collusive practices. Section IV
illustrates how the present legal framework falls short of providing
a sound response to algorithmic market manipulation and develops
a number of guiding principles for reform. Section V concludes.
II. AUTONOMOUS “AI TRADERS”: THE (PRESENT AND) FUTURE OF
ML-POWERED ALGORITHMIC TRADING
When exploring the implications of AI trading, it is first helpful
to review the current state of modern AI applications in the financial
See infra Section III.
See generally Thomas C. King, Nikita Aggarwal, Mariarosaria Taddeo &
Luciano Floridi, Artificial Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of
Foreseeable Threats and Solutions, 26 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 89 (2020) (offering a
systematic and interdisciplinary literature review of the foreseeable threats of AIrelated crimes and related ethical and legal questions); Wellman & Rajan, supra note
2, at 611-13 (addressing the ethical and legal issues relating to AI trading agents’
misconduct).
7
See, e.g., ANDREW W. LO, ADAPTIVE MARKETS: FINANCIAL EVOLUTION AT THE
SPEED OF THOUGHT 365-71 (ed. 2019) (arguing that “adaptive regulation” looks at the
financial system as an organic ecosystem, and rather than regulating market
behaviors via traditional “command-and-control” approach, it requires to develop
a better understanding of why misconducts arise and determine what aspects of the
environment need to be changed to constrain them).
5
6
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trading domain. In this Section, we will show that recent progress
in computational finance indeed brings us closer to the development
of truly autonomous algorithmic agents, based on AI, that can act
independently on the capital market and learn from the outcomes of
their own decisions, when given a pre-defined objective. This
prepares the ground for Section III, which addresses the role of AI
in facilitating new forms of algorithmic market abuse, irrespective
of any direct human involvement in gaming market rules.
When considering both determinants and path-dependencies of
the “algorithmic revolution” that, only in the last few decades, has
shaped global capital markets’ architecture and functioning,8 there
are good reasons to believe that algorithms will continue to gain an
increasingly pervasive role. Indeed, the financial industry is
currently undergoing profound digital transformation underpinned
by AI. 9 In global finance, algorithms contribute to conducting,
managing, and monitoring trading activities. Sometimes, they also
cause disruptions to the safe and orderly functioning of markets.10
Nevertheless, financial technology innovation—such as algorithmic
trading—has been generally supported by regulation to foster
competition among market participants on different levels, with the
8
See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678 (2013) (coining the
term “cyborg finance” to describe the beginning of a new era in global finance,
increasingly dominated by algorithms); see also Marc Lenglet, Conflicting Codes and
Codings: How Algorithmic Trading is Reshaping Financial Regulation, 28 THEORY,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 44 (2011) (arguing that the algorithmization of trading on capital
markets has had significant consequences for the nature of financial regulation).
9
See FSB, supra note 3; CARSTEN JUNG, HENRIKE MUELLER, SIMONE PEDEMONTE,
SIMONE PLANCES & OLIVER THREW, BANK OF ENG. & U.K. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (FCA),
MACHINE LEARNING IN UK FINANCIAL SERVICES (2020) [hereinafter FCA],
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/report/2019/machinelearning-in-uk-financialservices.pdf?la=en&hash=F8CA6EE7A5A9E0CB182F5D568E033F0EB2D21246
[https://perma.cc/W24Z-DE87] (surveying more than 100 financial firms within
the UK financial system); CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN. & WORLD ECON. FORUM,
TRANSFORMING PARADIGMS: A GLOBAL AI IN FINANCIAL SERVICES SURVEY (2020),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AI_in_Financial_Services_Survey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3GT-B2PD] (surveying around 150 financial firms from thirtythree different countries, and reporting that seventy-seven percent of all
respondents believe AI will have paramount importance for their business models
within the next two years).
10
See generally Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo, Moore’s Law versus
Murphy’s Law: Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS. 51 (2013)
(providing a brief survey of algorithmic trading, from its origins to fist accidents
caused to markets); Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in
Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015) (describing how algorithmic trading
has radically transformed markets and hampered prices’ informativeness and their
ability to serve allocative efficiency).
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objective of supporting the development of more efficient and liquid
markets.11
The proliferation of markets and financial assets, as well as the
acceleration of trading speed, are all fundamental factors
contributing to generating a massive amount of granular and highfrequency data.
Notably, to find profitable investment
opportunities, AI trading can exploit massive data that are no more
intelligible for the human mind.12 Useful data for AI today come in
very different forms and levels of quality (beyond traditional
financial data, such as fundamental data or market data and their
derivatives), with “alternative data” 13 taking on growing
importance. 14 Originally, algorithmic trading was based on
deterministic “rule-based” systems, which are notoriously
constrained by human experts’ knowledge and assumptions, both
tacit and explicit, about specific domains.15 Thanks to simultaneous
progress made in high-performance computing and communication
(e.g., edge/cloud computing) and Big Data analytics, ML methods
today allow for trading algorithms to be far more flexible to
changing market conditions, under different levels of autonomy.16
ML and Big Data are together the fundamental ingredients of most
innovative and cutting-edge algorithmic trading strategies. 17
11
On the role of financial regulation to foster innovation while safeguarding
competition and other public goals, see generally Wolf-Georg Ringe & Christopher
Ruof, Regulating Fintech in the EU: The Case for a Guided Sandbox, 11 EUR. J. RISK
REGUL. 604 (2020).
12
FSB, supra note 3, at 18 (reporting on the use of AI and machine learning to
devise trading and portfolio management strategies).
13
See MARKO KOLANOVIC & RAJESH T. KRISHNAMACHARI, J.P. MORGAN, BIG
DATA AND AI STRATEGIES: MACHINE LEARNING AND ALTERNATIVE DATA APPROACH TO
INVESTING
28-50
(2017)
https://www.cfasociety.org/cleveland/Lists/Events%20Calendar/Attachments/
1045/BIG-Data_AI-JPMmay2017.pdf (providing a comprehensive overview of
different kinds of alternative data, their taxonomy, and possible use for specific
trading strategies).
14
See MARCOS LÓPEZ DE PRADO, ADVANCES IN FINANCIAL MACHINE LEARNING
23-25 (2018).
15
For a comprehensive overview on ATSs, and their different components
and operational functioning, see generally Philip Treleaven, Michal Galas & Vidhi
Lalchand, Algorithmic Trading Review, 56 COMMC’NS ACM 76 (2013).
16
See FCA, supra note 9, at 2; see also Kolanovic & Krishnamachari, supra note
13, at 9-11.
17
These include strategies such as: (i) signal processing, the art of filtering
meaningful information from noisy data to discern trading patterns; (ii) market
sentiment analysis, a strategy that extrapolates markets appetite for trading by
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However, the prospect of fully autonomous AI agents is still
assumed today to be beyond imagination.
a. Towards Autonomous Trading Agents
ML can assist investment firms in both pattern recognition and
financial decision-making tasks. According to key differences in the
fields of algorithms learning from data, which also relates to the
varying degree of human involvement, three basic ML paradigms
exist. First, in “supervised learning” (SL) methods, which can be
used for regression and classification purposes, users need to train
their algorithms with pre-labeled empirical data, meaning that the
correct outputs for all trading data are known in advance. Once a
general rule has been learned, it has to be carefully validated and
tested before it is applied to, as an example, predictive trading
tasks.18 For instance, under SL, algorithms can use technical market
indicators or other useful data to predict the next day’s winning and
losing stocks from past observations yielded from empirical data.19
Secondly, in “unsupervised learning” (UL), which is instead used
for clustering and factor analyses, algorithms work without any prelabeled data provided by a human expert.20 Under this ML method,
algorithms autonomously infer patterns (e.g., “regularity”) in the
data with similar distinctive features.21 An ATS can jointly integrate
both SL and UL to solve different trading tasks. For instance, UL
algorithms can preliminarily perform a cluster analysis to extract
features from data to identify trading opportunities. The result is
learning from market activity; (iii) news reader, which leverages on the role of news
from different media to look for investment opportunities; and (iv) pattern
recognition, or the computational ability to learn from changing price patterns on
markets how to classify different market prices dynamics in order to anticipate
price movements to gain a profit. BONNIE G. BUCHANAN, ALAN TURING INST.,
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
IN
FINANCE
16
(2019),
https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/201904/artificial_intelligence_in_finance_-_turing_report_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HC3-WM9X].
18
See Kolanovic & Krishnamachari, supra note 13, at 18.
19
See Kolanovic & Krishnamachari, supra note 13, at 57 and 77 (discussing, in
technical detail, the functioning of supervised learning methods for regression and
classification purposes).
20
See Kolanovic & Krishnamachari, supra note 13, at 18.
21
See Kolanovic & Krishnamachari, supra note 13, at 93-101 (discussing, in
technical detail, the functioning of unsupervised learning methods for clustering
and factor analyses purposes).
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then passed, as input data, to the supervised learning component for
further computational steps, like stock price prediction. 22
Thereafter, the AI system is ready to execute trading. Thus, both ML
methods can assist investment firms in automating trading in
financial instruments. However, neither yet achieves autonomy in
ATSs, since some human assistance is still usually required to face
evolving market conditions, such as tail risk and unobserved market
events. 23 In fact, both methods are simply constrained by the
empirical nature of data. In contrast, although humans can infer
actions from their past experiences, they are known to also rely on,
for instance, hardly explicable intuition and gut feeling for decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty.24

22
For an early study combining supervised and unsupervised learning in a
hybrid strategy, see Cheng-Lung Huang & Cheng-Yi Tsai, A Hybrid SOFM-SVR
with a Filter-Based Feature Selection for Stock Market Forecasting, 36 EXPERT SYS. WITH
APPLICATIONS 1529 (2009) (combining an unsupervised learning algorithmic
component, responsible for filter-based feature selection to choose important input
attributes, with a supervised learning one that is subsequently called upon to
predict stock market prices index-based).
23
See John Moody, Lizhong Wu, Yuansong Liao & Matthew Saffell,
Performance Functions and Reinforcement Learning for Trading Systems and Portfolios,
17 J. FORECASTING 441, 442 (1998) (highlighting the fundamental trading policy
misalignment between supervised learning methods’ optimisation goal, which is
constrained to what the algorithm can observe and learn from historical data, with
the ultimate objective of a general investor that instead faces changing timedependent constraints due to constantly evolving market dynamics); see also
Quang-Vinh Dang, Reinforcement Learning in Stock Trading, in ADVANCED
COMPUTATIONAL METHODS FOR KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 311, 312 (Hoai An Le Thi,
Hoai Minh Le, Tao Pham Dinh & Ngoc Thanh Nguyen eds., 2019) (highlighting the
inadequacy to deal with time-delayed rewards as the main technical limitation of
supervised learning methods, these being constrained to only achieving the best
prediction at an exact local point in time and without considering any delayed
reward or punishment, as a result of which, supervised learning methods applied
to financial decision-making can only provide actionable recommendations, rather
than an entirely and effectively autonomous ATS).
24
For a behavioral economics study on the influence of emotions on the
decision making and performance of professional traders, see generally Mark
Fenton-O’Creevy, Emma Soane, Nigel Nicholson & Paul Willman, Thinking, Feeling
and Deciding: The Influence on the Decision Making and Performance of Traders, 32 J.
ORG. BEHAV. 1044 (2011), finding that experienced traders have a relatively high
meta-cognitive engagement with emotion regulation, allowing them to
discriminate between emotions in terms of their relevance to the decision at hand
and how to deal with them to enhance performance effectively. But see Andrew W.
Lo, Dmitry V. Repin & Brett N. Steenbarger, Fear and Greed in Financial Markets: A
Clinical Study of Day-Traders, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 352 (2005) (suggesting that emotions
can instead negatively impact on trading performance and that, in contrast,
successful trading may be due to a reduced level of emotional reactivity).
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Finally, and most importantly, a third ML paradigm under the
name of “reinforcement learning” (RL) has emerged to overcome
some of these limitations. 25 RL is the most advanced of the ML
paradigms in the context of our analysis below, as it lies at the
foundation of autonomous (software) agents. This very heterogenic
ML category encompasses computational approaches that allow
algorithms to learn, through a “trial-and-error” process, within an
uncertain and dynamic environment. In doing so, RL agents are
called to take action with the ultimate goal to realize a pre-defined
objective or optimize a cost or utility function pursuant to that
objective. In addition, as is the case in a real market context, RL
agents need to take into account the implications of their own
behaviors. In other words, they are goal-oriented and face a
constant trade-off between “exploration” and “exploitation” in the
space and/or time of a particular domain. Thus, RL agents must
“exploit” actions that were learned in the past to achieve the best
rewards. At the same time, exploiting implies the ability to
“explore” in advance the best policies among all options, both
known and unknown, in order to make better decisions in the
future.26 In a financial trading context, RL allows the “forecasting”
and “portfolio construction” tasks to be integrated, thus aligning the
ML problem with the investors’ ultimate goal. 27 In fact, unlike
(un)supervised methods, in which ML is used for generalization
purposes, RL agents aim to learn best policy actions that maximize
the likelihood of a long-term goal being achieved while also taking
into account real markets’ constraints, such as liquidity and
transaction costs. 28 In a manner of speaking, RL attempts to
resemble how human traders traditionally act on financial markets
and learn from their own trading experiences and strategies to
pursue their profit-maximizing objectives. The computational
finance literature has developed several RL applications for trading,
categorized according to the exact optimizing method employed in
25
See generally RICHARD S. SUTTON & ANDREW G. BARTO, REINFORCEMENT
LEARNING: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2017) (providing a thoughtful technical
introduction to RL methods).
26
Id. at 1-5.
27
Thomas G. Fischer, Reinforcement Learning in Financial Markets—A Survey 2
(Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg Instit. for Econ., Working
Paper
No.
12,
2018),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/183139/1/1032172355.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WL44-EPBJ].
28
Id.
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the self-learning process. 29 Not surprisingly, therefore, RL has
already had an enormous impact on optimizing financial trading
tasks, with promising results in high-frequency trading (HFT).30
Lately, much of the hype surrounding AI has been about “deep
learning” methods, a more recent sub-field in ML.31 Deep learning
is based on “artificial neural networks” (ANNs)—i.e., mathematical
models that by and large resemble the neuronal structure and
functioning of the human cortex—which aim to best approximate
input data by learning on multiple abstraction levels (cf.
“convolutional neural network” methods).32 ANNs can be used in
combination with SL and RL methods and are proposed to achieve
greater accuracy and predictive power in our application domain,33
albeit like other ML methods they can nevertheless be exposed to
human bias. 34 However, there can be other drawbacks, since,
29
However, all these different methods share the same core idea: to develop
a mathematical model that can plan future actions while also considering whether
and how the own actions will impact the market. Nevertheless, in developing RL
methods, the real challenge is to find meaningful data for the above formalisation.
Cf. id. at 3-35 (providing a detailed discussion on the three RL main paradigms,
namely the “critic,” “actor-only,” and “actor-critic,” and explaining how these
different RL methods deal with the mathematical problems of modeling the three
core RL models’ components such as “state,” “action,” and “space”).
30
See Michael Kearns & Yuriy Nevmyvaka, Machine Learning for Market
Microstructure and High Frequency Trading, in HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING: NEW
REALITIES FOR TRADERS, MARKETS AND REGULATORS 91, 92 (David Easley, Marcos
Lopez de Prado & Maureen O’Hara eds., 2013) (illustrating three RL applications
to HFT problems, such as (i) optimized trade execution; (ii) predicting price
movements from order book state; and (iii) optimized execution in dark pools via
censorship exploration).
31
William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 337,
344 (2020). For an introduction to deep learning methods and their technicalities,
see generally Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521
NATURE 436 (2015) (discussing various methods of deep learning, including
supervised learning, backpropagation, convolutional neural network, and
distributed representation and language processing).
32
Cf. Li Deng & Dong Yu, Deep Learning: Methods and Applications, 7 FOUNDS.
& TRENDS SIGNAL PROCESSING 197, 224 (2013).
33
See generally Ahmet Murat Ozbayoglu, Mehmet Ugur Gudelek & Omer
Berat Sezer, Deep Learning for Financial Applications: A Survey, 93 APPLIED SOFT
COMPUTING J. 1, 1 (2020) (providing an exhaustive review of deep learning methods
combined with supervised learning and reinforcement learning, with many
algorithmic trading examples).
34
This is notwithstanding the effects of the so-called “inductive bias,” i.e., the
series of assumptions made by the model to learn the target function and generalize
from training data. See Anirudh Goyal & Yoshua Bengio, Inductive Biases for Deep
Learning of Higher-Level Cognition 3 (Feb. 17, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors) (examining the role of different inductive biases that can be used
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besides a greater propensity towards “overfitting,” 35 these ML
methods are accompanied by the so-called problem of the “black
box.”36 The “black box” problem is where both the developers and
users of AI may not fully understand and explain why and how their
algorithms have generated a particular output given specific data
input.37 The “black box” problem is often framed in terms of issues
of AI “transparency,” “explainability,” and “trustworthiness,”
especially for ML-based decision-making in critical domains related
to human life,38 which underpins the problem of “auditability” and
“accountability” in cases of AI wrongdoing. 39 As we will see in
Section IV, the “black box” problem is central to our assessment of
existing legal systems’ ability to effectively cope with circumstances
of market abuse by autonomous AI traders.
The combination of “deep” and “reinforcement learning”
techniques allows for the creation of so-called “deep reinforcement
to encourage the learning process of deep learning methods to prioritize solutions
according to certain properties).
35
“Overfitting” refers to the problem that models are too specific to training
data that can generalize poorly on new datasets; as such, overfitting models cannot
safely be applied on real markets. See Shihao Gu, Bryan Kelly & Dacheng Xiu,
Empirical Asset Pricing via Machine Learning, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 2223, 2225 (2020); see
also LÓPEZ DE PRADO, supra note 14, at 151-56 (highlighting the fundamental role of
backtesting techniques to prevent overfitting, as well as the ability by users to
understand the importance of data features for their models).
36
See generally Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability: In
Machine Learning, the Concept of Interpretability is Both Important and Slippery, ACM
QUEUE, May-June 2018 (discussing the many possible facets of the concept of AI
“black box” model “interpretability”). But see LÓPEZ DE PRADO, supra note 14, at 1516, 114 (dismissing the “black box” argument as a misconception, and arguing that
any conscious use of ML in financial trading is only possible by means of “white
boxes” algorithms, which also requires a sound understanding on data feature and
their importance for the model).
37
For a concise explanation of the “black box” problem in AI decisionmaking, see generally Dino Pedreschi et al., Meaningful Explanations of Black Box AI
Decision Systems, THIRTY-THIRD AAAI CONFERENCE ON A.I. (AAAI-19) 9780 (2019)
(discussing the “black box” problem from an ethical perspective, and reviewing
both technical challenges and possible solutions to achieve meaningful
explainability in opaque ML-based systems).
38
See generally Eur. Comm’n, HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
ETHICS
GUIDELINES
FOR
TRUSTWORTHY
AI
(2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=60419
[perma.cc/J6AU-A789].
39
See Alejandro Barredo Arrieta et al., Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI):
Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges Toward Responsible AI, 58 INFO.
FUSION 82, 84 (2020) (offering an overview of recent efforts to achieve AI
explainability and stressing the relevance of AI explainability to guarantee effective
auditability and accountability in relation to different AI stakeholders).
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learning” (DRL) methods. By combining the upsides of these two
ML paradigms, DRL algorithms are able to take in very large
datasets, find latent correlations thanks to deep learning, and learn
to decide which actions to perform in order to optimize a function
via RL in pursuit of a pre-defined objective.40 Autonomous agents
based on DRL have achieved tremendous success by showing
superior-to-human capabilities in many real-life settings, including
video41 and board games,42 among others.43 With that in mind, DRL
methods could arguably be used to achieve autonomous AI trading
agents, eventually implying the exclusion of human control as the
last resort. Within the scientific community, a growing amount of
published work has been applying DRL agents to financial trading
problems.44 Under DRL, for instance, AI traders can, first, gain datadriven insights about a complex and dynamic trading environment
via DL and, second, use RL to flexibly learn optimal trading
strategies solely through their trading activities on markets, which
provide constant feedback on their performance. 45 But the
possibilities do not end here: in principle, several ML components
can be integrated into DRL-based ensemble strategies to achieve
40
For a first introduction to DRL algorithms, see Kai Arulkumaran, Marc
Peter Deisenroth, Miles Brundage & Anil Anthony Bharath, A Brief Survey of Deep
Reinforcement Learning, IEEE SIGNAL PROCESSING MAG., Sept. 27, 2017, at 1-13.
41 See Volodymyr Mnih et al., Human-Level Control Through Deep Reinforcement
Learning, 518 NATURE 529, 529-530 (2015) (developing a deep Q-network
algorithmic agent that, fed with games’ graphic pixels and score as the only input
data, achieved professional human gamers’ ability across a set of forty-nine
different Atari 2600 games).
42
See David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks
and Tree Search, 529 NATURE 484, 484 (2016) (developing the first DRL agents able to
defeat a human professional player in the full-sized game of Go by training them
through a novel combination of supervised learning from human expert games and
reinforcement learning from simulated games).
43
For an early overview of different DRL methods and their successful
application in different real-life settings, see generally Arulkumaran et al., supra
note 40 (providing an overview of the field of reinforcement learning including
deep-Q network, trust region policy optimization, and asynchronous advantage
actor-critic).
44
See Zihao Zhang, Stefan Zohren & Stephen Roberts, Deep Reinforcement
Learning for Trading, J. FIN. DATA SCI. 25 (2020) (designing a deep reinforcement
learning algorithmic agent to derive trading strategies for continuous future
contracts).
45
See generally Yue Deng, Feng Bao, Youyong Kong, Zhiquan Ren & Qionghai
Dai, Deep Direct Reinforcement Learning for Financial Signal Representation and Trading,
28 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON NEURAL NETWORK & LEARNING SYS. 653 (2017) (discussing
how to train AI to trade through a recurrent deep neural network for real time
financial signal representation and trading).
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different levels of system sophistication and autonomy.46 Various
AI agents can be combined in multi-agent systems to benefit from
their different skill specializations,47 or in ensemble strategies where
they need to act jointly to achieve best performance.48 It follows that
current research in computational finance provides initial evidence
about DRL methods as main ML frameworks for the successful
implementation of increasingly capable and autonomous AI trading
agents.
b. Ongoing Progress and Challenges
Given all this progress made in theories, methods, and
technologies, it is worth emphasizing that algorithmic trading
agents are called upon to operate within a complex and dynamic
market environment. Real markets can be substantially different
and more complex than in-lab simulation environments, making it
hard to effectively and safely develop autonomous AI agents for
real-life applications. In fact, the successful implementation of AI
agents via RL methods requires taking into account several
limitations, among which the “curse of dimensionality”49 is only one
See Ozbayoglu et al., supra note 33, at 6.
See generally Salvatore Carta, Andrea Corriga, Anselmo Ferreira,
Alessandro Sebastian Podda & Diego Reforgiato Recupero, A Multi-Layer and MultiEnsemble Stock Trader Using Deep Learning and Deep Reinforcement Learning, 51
APPLIED INTEL. 889, 889-905 (2020) (developing a multi-layer and multi-ensemble
stock trading agent by combining deep learning and reinforcement learning
methods in a unique strategy to trade on futures markets).
48
See generally Salvatore Carta, Anselmo Ferreira, Alessandro Sebastian
Podda, Diego Reforgiato Recupero & Antonio Sanna, Multi-DQN: An Ensemble of
Deep Q-learning Agents for Stock Market Forecasting, 164 EXPERT SYS. WITH
APPLICATIONS (2021) (proposing a novel ensemble of same DRL algorithms that, by
developing different experiences on market dynamics, engage in cooperative tasks
to reach best policy actions by agreement on competing strategies).
49
In reinforcement learning methods, the “curse of dimensionality” refers to
the problem arising when RL agents are called to learn from a too large or
continuous “environment,” i.e., in a high-dimensional data space. See, e.g., Vangelis
Bacoyannis, Vacslav Glukhov, Tom Jin, Jonathan Kochems & Doo Re Song,
Idiosyncrasies and Challenges of Data Driven Learning in Electronic Trading 4-5
(NIPS 2018 Workshop on Challenges and Opportunities for AI in Financial
Services) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (“Describing the market
state of the limit order book is a variable dimension and high dimension problem.”).
But see, e.g., Silvio Barra, Salvatore Mario Carta, Andrea Corriga, Alessandro
Sebastian Podda & Diego Reforgiato Recupero, Deep Learning and Time Series-toImage Encoding for Financial Forecasting, 7 IEEE/CAA J. AUTOMATICA SINICA 683
46
47
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facet. 50 More generally, there are also fundamental challenges in
assessing the quality of ML research applied to financial trading.
While ML research is successfully expanding, computational
finance literature has so far failed to provide a convincing scientific
framework or even methodology to analyze different ML methods
(i.e., theoretical limits, accuracy, and experimental success and
failure).51 Unlike other AI fields of application, no clear benchmark
exists yet to assess and compare competing ML algorithms for
financial trading.52 Apart from this, proprietary details regarding
the nature and role of the utilized empirical data as well as
information about the learning process itself (or “hyper parameters”
in general) further complicate or even prohibit the comparison of
different ML research findings,53 thus rendering the replication of
ML results impossible.
Moreover, AI traders’ autonomy and complexity also exacerbate
the agency problem in algorithmic trading. Financial laws usually
require trading algorithms to produce predictable, controllable, and
explainable trading behavior, not least to avoid disrupting financial
markets’ orderly functioning.54 Accordingly, users of AI should be
able to explain how AI systems reach their optimized trading
strategies to comply with financial law and regulation, including
taking accountability for affecting clients, consumers, or the public.
Despite all these difficulties, we believe that it is realistic to
expect autonomous AI traders to become a reality on trading floors
one day. Once they become a reality, a number of the policy issues
mentioned above will come to the fore. To start, acknowledging that
the most innovative ML research advancements are likely to emerge
within investment firms’ proprietary projects, protected by
(2020) (addressing the issue by employing “Gramian angular fields”—GAF—
images generated from time series, a novel computational approach intended to
simplify computational processes).
50
See Fischer, supra note 27, at 38-39 (providing an overview of both strengths
and weaknesses for different reinforcement learning methods).
51
For an overview of the most relevant limitations in the ML research applied
to financial forecasting, see generally Spyros Makridakis, Evangelos Spiliotis &
Vassilios Assimakopoulos, Statistical and Machine Learning Forecasting Methods:
Concerns and Ways Forward, PLOS ONE, Mar. 27, 2018.
52
See Lukas Ryll & Sebastian Seidens, Evaluating the Performance of Machine
Learning Algorithms in Financial Market Forecasting: A Comprehensive Survey 1-2 (July
6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
53
Id.
54
Cf. Bacoyannis et al., supra note 49, at 5-6 (arguing that “hierarchical”
reinforcement learning methods could assist investment firms in compliance tasks).
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intellectual property rights, is certainly not reassuring from a policy
perspective. Indeed, and given that academic research is openly
accessible but still limited in scope, there are significant risks that
the AI technology in financial trading may evolve without any
sound normative considerations or even academic and public
scrutiny. While AI is undoubtedly proposed as a game-changer for
trading on capital markets, both regulators and market participants
could become concerned about specific ML methods and
applications leading to greater uncertainties and novel risks.
Indeed, this is the first time in human history that we are delegating
cognitive agency to algorithms to be utilized in critical domains
despite knowing that, in the worst-case scenario, we could become
incapable of controlling their functioning.
III. ALGORITHMIC MARKET ABUSE BY AUTONOMOUS AI TRADERS
We have seen above that the technological potential for the
emergence of truly autonomous agents that trade on capital markets
is realistic. Furthermore, we have shown that the most advanced of
these trading machines will be able to learn and refine a particular
investment strategy independently, given a pre-defined goal (most
likely, profit maximization). This seemingly positive development
has a dark side, however, where investment decisions by
independent algorithms could be used for trading strategies that
undermine the laws of capital markets—and would be applied to
maximize profit from manipulative practices or collusion.
With the rise of algorithmic trading, innovative manipulative
schemes inevitably arise, and forms of algorithmic manipulation
have indeed emerged already. 55 With the prospect of fully
autonomous AI traders proliferating global capital markets
sometime soon, new and unprecedented algorithmic crime
scenarios can also arise. Precisely with these risks in mind, this
Section deals with new forms of market manipulation by
autonomous AI traders, including new abusive cartel-like

55
See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1288
(2017) (coining the term “cybernetic market manipulation” to describe both old and
new forms market manipulation strategies by means of trading algorithms).
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scenarios, 56 their likelihood according to both markets’
microstructure and AI technical limitations, and related social harm
as a consequence of market failures.57
a. Old and New Algorithmic Market Manipulation
The institutional role of capital markets is—as an ideal—to allow
for the efficient allocation of financial resources and appropriate
risk-sharing among market participants. In contrast, due to
potentially being harmful to financial markets’ efficiency and
detrimental to public confidence in their proper functioning, some
market conduct is considered illegitimate per se. 58 As a form of
market abuse, for instance, market manipulation represents an
illegitimate expression of market conduct. More specifically, market
manipulation refers to any conscious attempt to interfere with the
free and fair nature of trading activity, which must characterize the
ordinary functioning of capital markets. As economic phenomena,
manipulative conducts aim to alter artificially the price of one or
more financial instruments or to influence natural forces of market
activity with deceptive means to induce other investors to trade.59
Therefore, in the absence of a market mechanism able to deal with
market abuses such as market manipulation, regulatory
intervention seeks to nudge market participants towards positive
56
There are growing concerns among competition law scholars on
autonomous AI pricing agents’ ability to lead to new forms of collusive outcomes.
See generally Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion:
When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775 (2017) (exploring four
basic scenarios where AI can foster anti-competitive market behavior between
competing firms, including what they define as the “Digital Eye” scenario in which
collusion arise from autonomous AI decision-making as a rational strategy); see also
Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1323 (2016) (discussing how pricing algorithms have changed specific
industries’ market dynamics and how increased autonomy in algorithmic decisionmaking threatens traditional competition law concepts and enforcement tools).
57
While few tentative studies deal with both ethical and legal issues of market
manipulation by autonomous AI traders, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study addressing the risk of algorithmic “tacit” collusion on capital markets.
For other similar studies, see, for example, Wellman & Rajan, supra note 2, at 616
(discussing the risks of autonomous AI trading engaging in “statistical arbitrage”
strategies).
58
EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 148 (2005).
59
Id. at 107.
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behaviors. 60 Whenever this does not have the desired deterrent
effect, the law punishes transgressors with sanctions. As the
economic nature and socially harmful effects of market
manipulation are well known, 61 legal systems generally contain
statutory prohibitions from specific financial laws against these
forms of market abuse,62 with the only difference being that they
provide different legal definitions and scope of application of the
prohibition of market manipulation.63
But see discussion infra Section IV.D.
See generally, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V Rauterberg,
Stock Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 67 (2018)
(addressing the harmful welfare effect of open market manipulation, and how
financial law and regulation should deal with these forms of market abuse).
62
In the U.S. legal system, the prohibition against market manipulation is
expressed in a number of statutes and legal provisions. On the one hand, Section
9(a)(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act prohibits transactions in securities that
create (i) “actual or apparent active trading in such security, or raising or depressing
the price of such security,” (ii) “for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of
such security by others.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2). While this provision seems well
suited to deal with market manipulation cases, its jurisprudence has failed to
provide a clear legal framework on what really constitutes an “illegitimate
purpose” to trade. See, e.g., Fox et al. supra note 61, at 114-17 (discussing the U.S.
case law on the matter and arguing that this rule has only had a minimal role in
developing the manipulation jurisprudence). On the other hand, Section 10(b) has
found a greater scope of application against market manipulation. Notably, Section
10(b) (and particularly Rule 10b-5) deals with the prohibition of “manipulative”
conduct that operates or attempts to operate as fraud or deceit upon other market
participants. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Notwithstanding its
broad application scope to different manipulative strategies, Section 10(b) focuses
on fraud-like market abuse. Indeed, there is an intense split between legal scholars
and courts on whether, absent an additional act or omission, trading activity alone
can amount to market manipulation. See Fox et al., supra note 61, at 118-22
(summarizing the ongoing debate among U.S. courts on the need to prove an
additional element to trading alone, in order to configure and prosecute against
cases of market manipulation). Finally, the Commodity and Exchange Act contains
specific legal provisions on the prohibition of market manipulation of commodity
prices. For instance, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act has codified the prohibition of “spoofing” (i.e., intentionally
submitting trading orders with the intention to cancel them before execution to
deceive other market participants). See, e.g., Gregory Scopino, Do Automated Trading
Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for
Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. REV. 221, 293 (2016)
(assessing the merits of the Dodd-Frank reform and discussing the general issues
in dealing with intent-based tests to deal with algorithmic market manipulation).
63
The scope of application of market abuse regulations differs across
jurisdictions. For instance, in the U.S., the above-mentioned Section 9(a)(2) does
not apply to over-the-counter financial instruments. In the EU, instead, spot FX
contracts are not protected by MAR. See Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Market Abuse (Market
60
61

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/2

2021] Machine Learning, Market Manipulation, and Collusion
i.

97

Autonomous AI-Style Market Manipulations

As computational finance technology evolves, malicious actors
are presented with great incentives to refine and craft new tools to
manipulate markets. That humans can employ algorithms for
unlawful purposes is nothing new in finance. There is indeed
growing empirical evidence,64 as well as a number of litigation cases,
concerning the liability of market participants that successfully
manipulate markets through algorithmic—and, particularly, HFT—
strategies.65
Since AI can help investment firms to optimize their business
operations, delegating financial trading decision-making to AI
systems can arguably lead to optimized algorithmic manipulation
strategies and result in very profitable trading solutions. 66 Of
course, manipulation can involve significant costs and risks before
any profit can materialize. 67 Consequently, investing enormous
resources to train AI trading systems to learn manipulative
strategies, either from historical or simulated examples or through
an online observation of market dynamics, might not be worth the
Abuse Regulation) and Repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and
2004/72/EC, art. 2(1) and (2), 2014 O.J. (L173) 2, 3; see also MAR REVIEW REPORT,
EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY (ESMA) 26 (2020),
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma70-1562391_final_report_-_mar_review.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN8D-7C86] (comparing
the EU regulatory regime applied to spot FX contracts to the Australian one,
wherein FX falls within the scope of market abuse regulations).
64
See, e.g., Jiading Gai, Chen Yao & Mao Ye, The Externalities of High-Frequency
Trading, 6-7 (WBS Fin. Grp. Rsch. Paper, Working Paper No. 180, 2013) (providing
interesting empirical evidence about some HFT manipulative strategies on U.S.traded stocks).
65
For a recent case involving U.S. authorities prosecuting one of the leading
global investment firms, JP Morgan Chase & Co., which was found guilty of
manipulating the price of U.S. Treasury securities by trading strategies aimed at
misleading other market participants, see J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, File No. 3-20094
(2020) (admin. order).
66
See Jón Daníelsson, Robert Macrae & Andreas Uthemann, Artificial
Intelligence and Systemic Risk, J. BANKING & FIN. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at
1-2) (on file with authors) (arguing that using AI by malicious actors to optimize
their techniques to harm markets is a major concern for financial stability).
67
Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in
Financial Markets? 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991) (arguing that the law should rule out
the prohibition of trade-based market manipulation, as it is usually hard to
distinguish this unlawful trading conduct from legitimate trading activity, and
because any attempt to market manipulation can always result in uneconomic
outcomes for perpetrators).
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financial commitment, given all involved risks at stake (e.g., market,
operational, legal, and reputational risks). However, thanks to
continuous progress being made in the optimization capabilities of
specific ML methods (i.e., deep learning), increasingly autonomous
AI trading systems could lead to even trickier manipulative
scenarios. Autonomous AI agents could learn and discover both old
and new ways to exploit market rules while pursuing their profitmaximizing objectives as an optimal and rational strategy,
irrespective of the prior intent of the human developers or users.68
Yet, cases of prosecution for liability for algorithmic market
manipulation do not shed much light on the actual degree of
autonomy and sophistication of the algorithms employed by
malicious actors. As intellectual propriety rights generally protect
algorithms’ codes, we cannot expect proprietary trading firms to
disclose precious details about the inner functioning of their “black
box” ML algorithms and trading techniques. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to believe that AI can offer malicious actors a broader
spectrum of opportunistic strategies with which to game markets.
For only this reason, market conduct authorities should start to
identify and assess new risks arising from the use of increasingly
capable and autonomous AI solutions for financial trading.
ii.

Case Studies

Without purporting to be an exhaustive list, in this section we
consider specific algorithmic trading strategies that seem to be wellsuited for AI-style market manipulation. 69 Admittedly, the
68 See Takanobu Mizuta, Can an AI Perform Market Manipulation at Its Own
Discretion?—A Genetic Algorithm Learns in an Artificial Market Simulation, 2020 IEEE
SYMPOSIUM SERIES ON COMPUTATIONAL INTEL. 407 (2020) (developing a deep learning
agent, using genetic algorithms, able to discover market manipulation as an optimal
strategy in an artificial market simulation); see also Enrique Martínez-Miranda et al.,
Learning Unfair Trading: A Market Manipulation Analysis from the Reinforcement
Learning Perspective, 2016 IEEE CONFERENCE ON EVOLVING & ADAPTIVE INTELLIGENT
SYS. 103 (2016) (investigating the causes that can lead a reinforcement learning
trading agent to discover and enter manipulative strategies, such as “spoofing” or
“pinging”).
69
Very little indeed is known about new and emerging algorithmic forms of
market manipulation. See Tālis J. Putniņš, An Overview of Market Manipulation, in
CORRUPTION AND FRAUD IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: MALPRACTICE, MISCONDUCT AND
MANIPULATION 13, 35-37 (Carol Alexander & Douglas Cumming eds., 2020)
(arguing that new legal questions will surely arise for cases of market manipulation
by autonomous AI trading agents).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/2

2021] Machine Learning, Market Manipulation, and Collusion

99

proprietary HFT industry is a market segment where AI traders
could achieve great results, both for good and evil. In fact, HFT
markets produce, at frightening speed, massive market
microstructure data that AI-based trading strategies could more
easily exploit also for unlawful purposes.
For instance,
advancements in AI can bring forth new, or optimize known,
“deceptive” and “aggressive” HFT strategies, 70 which have been
under increasing scrutiny from regulators. Indeed, AI could
optimize those strategies that seek to deceive other market
participants through fast submission and cancellation of orders, 71
such as “spoofing.” 72 Significantly, order-based algorithmic
strategies are somehow constrained by venues’ rules limiting the
“orders to transactions ratio” (OTR), aimed at disadvantaging non
bona fide trading orders.
However, by algorithmic learning,
autonomous AI traders could find ways to optimize manipulation
strategies within OTR statutory limits. Indeed, recent in-lab market
simulations involving “reinforcement learning” agents provide
some first evidence. Manipulation strategies like “spoofing” can
emerge via RL without any prior human intent: AI traders’
exploring of markets’ microstructures by placing false orders would
eventually be learned and applied as a profitable and rational
strategy, which could, in turn, be “exploited” to maximize profits.73
Elsewhere, autonomous AI trading can find profitable
application in “aggressive” HFT strategies such as “pinging” or
“momentum ignition.”74 In “pinging,” where the aim is to detect
hidden resting orders on books by “pinging” markets in the quest
for liquidity,75 AI trading (e.g., thanks to DRL methods) might learn
70
Cf. LÓPEZ DE PRADO, supra note 14, at 293-94 (discussing several categories
of “predatory” algorithms that use cancellations and other order-based strategies
to adversely select other market participants).
71
LÓPEZ DE PRADO, supra note 14, at 293-94.
72
The term “spoofing” refers to algorithmic trading strategies that leverage a
high level of order submissions and cancellations before execution, in an attempt to
deceive other market participants. See Lin, supra note 55, at 1289; Gregory Scopino,
The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front Running” in the Futures
Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607, 648-654 (2015) (discussing recent developments on
the legal treatment of “spoofing” by U.S. regulators and courts).
73
See Martínez-Miranda et al., supra note 68, at 107-08.
74
See Scopino, supra note 72, at 626 (quoting the U.S. SEC defining these
strategies as “parasitic”).
75
See Scopino, supra note 72, at 622-26 (arguing that high speed “pinging”
relying substantially on high levels of orders submission and cancellation could
arguably be rendered illegal as it does not provide real benefits to market
efficiency).
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important insights from market dynamics and even develop an
understanding of rivals’ algorithmic trading strategies. Hence, with
this knowledge, AI traders could be able to anticipate other traders’
strategies and forthcoming orders, 76 including periodical public
authorities’ open market operations. Meanwhile, in “momentum
ignition” strategies, the aim is to anticipate and initiate a sharp price
trend on markets to attract other algorithmic traders to trade on the
same asset. 77 Herein, again, AI can lead to optimized deceptive
strategies. In effect, a growing body of research within the
computational finance community is explicitly dedicated to the art
of reading trends from market dynamics via ML methods, 78
something that could arguably be used by malicious actors to
implement aggressive strategies, such as momentum ignition.
In increasingly interconnected but fragmented global capital
markets, algorithmic manipulators can also find emerging
opportunities to discover new and profitable ways to game market
rules by crossing the silos inherent to the control mechanisms by
applying cross-market and cross-asset manipulation strategies.79 In
principle, thanks to increased analytical and computational skills, AI
trading may reach market-wise ubiquity levels, allowing for
optimized and, thus, more effective cross-market manipulations
76
Cf. Nicholas Hirschey, Do High-Frequency Traders Anticipate Buying and
Selling Pressure?, 67 MGMT. SCI. 3321, 3343 (2021) (finding evidence of a so-called
“anticipatory” trading channel that allows HFTs to increase other market
participants’ costs); Viktoria Dalko & Michael H. Wang, High-Frequency Trading:
Order-Based Innovation or Manipulation?, 21 J. BANKING REGUL. 289, 293-94 (2020)
(arguing that HFT market-making strategies may enjoy a time advantage relative
to other market participants).
77
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 3461358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3609 (Jan. 21, 2010).
78
See, e.g., JUN CHEN & EDWARD P.K. TSANG, DETECTING REGIME CHANGE IN
COMPUTATIONAL FINANCE: DATA SCIENCE, MACHINE LEARNING AND ALGORITHMIC
TRADING xix (2021) (“Our book is an attempt to push forward in the field of financial
analysis, using new ways to engage with financial data, under our chosen method
of Directional Change, and harnessing some of the cutting-edge tools of machine
learning and the related algorithmic trading.”).
79
See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS,
INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING MARKET MANIPULATION, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS 2 (May 2000) (hereinafter IOSCO)
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD103.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AX8P-M52V]; see also Yesha Yadav, Algorithmic Trading and
Market Regulation, in GLOBAL ALGORITHMIC CAPITAL MARKETS: HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING, DARK POOLS, AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 240 (Walter Mattli ed., 2018)
(“[A]lgorithmic trading has thickened interconnections across venues and asset
classes. Algorithmic traders can transact across multiple platforms . . . to engage in
arbitrage-related strategies or to make markets.”).
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capable of monitoring the same financial assets across several
venues simultaneously.80 Furthermore, as new financial products
are engineered, there are greater opportunities for AI trading to
discover cross-asset manipulation as well. For instance, as
derivatives are priced in relation to their underlying financial assets,
manipulators may find increased incentives to manipulate the latter
after accumulating a financial position with respect to the former.81
Furthermore, it is foreseeable that AI traders will engage in
innovative manipulative strategies beyond mere trade-based
manipulations, by leveraging the role of media technology. 82
Consider, for instance, the role of the Internet. It can indeed serve
as a facilitator for manipulative strategies as a relatively easy, cheap,
and effective means of disseminating misleading information, in
order to intentionally move the prices of, or create some appearance
of interest in, financial products.83 Thus, whether being explicitly
programmed or instructed by humans or operating in a fully
autonomous way, AI traders can engage in some forms of
information-based manipulation. AI traders can also learn to take
actions in the cyberspace by observing and interacting with social
media content or other relevant media to mislead other market
participants, including rivals’ news-reading algorithms.84
To sum up, there persists a lack of definitive evidence regarding
autonomous AI traders’ ability to engage in market manipulation
without them being explicitly programmed or instructed to do so by
humans. However, this might become a real and serious risk soon,
looking at the constant and spectacular achievements in ML
methods enhancing the autonomy of AI traders (i.e., DRL). As we
80
Cf. Joseph Zabel, Rethinking Open- and Cross-Market Manipulation
Enforcement, 15 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 417, 464 (2021) (discussing how algorithmic
trading undermines the ability of prosecutors to regulate and enforce against crossmarket manipulation strategies).
81
See Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 217, 250
(2015) (arguing that derivatives and other financial benchmarks are increasingly
targets of manipulative strategies nowadays, given their economic function as a
reference value for pricing other financial assets).
82
See Lin, supra note 55, at 1292-94 (expecting financial markets to witness
more audacious and innovative schemes aiming at distorting market prices by
disseminating false information via digital media).
83
See IOSCO, supra note 79, at 2-3.
84
See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent
and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 911-13 (2018) (providing an illustrative
example on AI traders engaging in “paint-the-tape” manipulative strategies by
posting content on social media, like Twitter or Facebook, to deceive other market
participants).
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will discuss below in Section IV, existing market abuse regulations
might be subverted if this reality were to materialize. After all,
looking to the future, AI traders are likely to discover and engage in
both old and new market manipulation strategies with increased
autonomy. If there are no major technical limits to what AI can
actually achieve anytime soon, AI trading systems could even
develop unexpected abilities and impact things beyond mere
trading, outside the physical boundaries of capital markets
informational systems and networks.85
b. Algorithmic Interconnectedness and New Risks of “Tacit” Collusion
The financial services industry is not immune to collective forms
of market abuse. Like the notorious rigging of the LIBOR and of
foreign exchange currency markets, recent scandals clearly illustrate
the vulnerabilities of global finance to collusion risks.86 As capital
markets are increasingly populated by trading algorithms, it might
be the right time to assess how they are reshaping the competitive
landscape. Indeed, because firms are increasingly adopting AI
pricing agents to compete on markets, global regulators and
national antitrust authorities alike are increasingly concerned about
emerging risks of algorithmic collusion emerging on many digital

85
Cf. EKATERINA SIROTYUK & RYAN BENNETT, CREDIT SUISSE, THE RISE OF THE
MACHINES TECHNOLOGY ENABLED INVESTING 7 (2017), https://cdn.efundresearch.com/files/white_paper_technology_enabled_investing_via_local_e
ntities.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YWJ-85F4] (speculating on the future possibility to
achieve “general AI” capabilities in algorithmic trading systems).
86
Notably, both scandals in the EU led several major global banks to record
fines imposed by the EU Commission. For the prosecution of the LIBOR case by
EU competition law authority, see European Commission Press Release
IP/13/1208, The Commission, AMENDED— Antitrust: Commission Fines Banks
€ 1.49 Billion for Participating in Cartels in the Interest Rate Derivatives Industry
(Dec.
4,
2013)
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/
memo_13_1090/MEMO_13_1090_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RC9-ZU4H]. For
the FX scandal, see European Commission Press Release IP/19/2568, The
Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Barclays, RBS, Citigroup, JPMorgan and
MUFG €1.07 Billion for Participating in Foreign Exchange Spot Trading Cartel (May
16,
2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/i
p_19_2568/IP_19_2568_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFF3-EQ5F].
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markets. 87 As global capital markets are increasingly digital
marketplaces and may also witness the proliferation of increasingly
autonomous AI traders soon, we ultimately believe that assessing
the likelihood of algorithmic collusion risks emerging within the
financial domain is both timely and relevant, given the role played
by global and vulnerable capital markets in financing general
economic activities.
Ultimately, financial technology and
innovation should assist society to achieve broader public goals
(e.g., market safety and integrity).
i.

Algorithms as Facilitators for Collusion

Although a fascinating research topic for financial sociologists,
algorithms and their interactions have not received a great deal of
attention from legal scholars. Sociologically speaking, the entrance
of algorithms on trading floors has contributed to shaping the
behaviors and relationships of traders. Today, global capital
markets are awash with competing trading algorithms that interact
and communicate by solely observing and populating electronic
books. 88 However, financial theory and law have paid too little
attention to the properties, functioning, and effects of algorithms.
Because of this knowledge gap, capital markets’ integrity and
stability may be impaired by the unforeseeable interaction of
algorithms in certain domains, including new forms of algorithmic
“tacit” collusion.89
Notably, humans can use algorithms as facilitating technology
to manage cartel agreements successfully. In digital marketplaces,
by generally enhancing market transparency and speeding up the
87
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 18-32 (2017)
[hereinafter OECD], https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Algorithms-andcolllusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.pdf
[https://perma.cc/669NETQX]; see also Mehra, supra note 56, at 1368-73 (quoting most recent contributions
by competition law scholars).
88 See generally Donald MacKenzie, How Algorithms Interact: Goffman’s
“Interaction Order” in Automated Trading, 36 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 39 (2019)
(providing two particularly Goffmanesque aspects of algorithmic interaction:
“queuing” and “spoofing”).
89
See generally OECD, supra note 87, at 34-36 (discussing some of the
challenges algorithms present for both competition law enforcement and market
regulation); see Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Sustainable and Unchallenged
Algorithmic Tacit Collusion, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 217, 217 (2020); see also
Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 56, at 1795-96.
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frequency of interactions among market actors, algorithms can relax
many competitive constraints.90 Thus, algorithmic interactions can
render cartel monitoring and retaliation against cheaters more
economically effective.
By delegating decision-making to
algorithms, therefore, competing firms can find greater
opportunities to achieve collusive outcomes, both explicitly and
tacitly. Using algorithms as a mere collusive device does not
create per se new competition law concerns, for an “explicit” cartel
agreement between collusive parties is required a priori. In all such
cases, algorithms serve merely as technology to organize cartel
agreements. In contrast, enforcement authorities can somehow
safely rely on traditional legal concepts and enforcement tools.91 Yet
cases of explicit algorithmic collusion can still present enforcement
challenges regarding the assessment of their likelihood, ensuring
detection, and ultimately attributing liability. 92 For instance, the
ways algorithms interact on markets can lead to unforeseeable
consequences and result in severe disruptions, especially in a capital
market context. Accounting for all possible ways in which
algorithms interact on markets complicates enforcement action. 93
Besides, as algorithms increase in complexity and are equipped with
enhanced autonomy, enforcement mechanisms will need to keep
pace with market developments.94
ii.

The Economics of Algorithmic “Tacit” Collusion

There is one main concern among regulators and competition
law scholars with regard to the relationship between AI and
competition. In digital marketplaces, increasingly sophisticated AI
pricing agents (e.g., those based on DRL methods) could discover,
by self-learning, how to coordinate behaviors with their rivals,
without being expressly instructed by their human developers or
90
See, e.g., Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 67, 71 (2019).
91
See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 56, at 1784-96 (arguing that the safe
application of competition law’s traditional enforcement concepts and tools
depends on algorithms’ precise use as a collusive device and their actual level of
sophistication).
92
See OECD, supra note 87, at 33.
93
See OECD, supra note 87, at 24-26 (using the May 2010 Flash Crash as an
example of algorithmic disruption on markets).
94
See OECD, supra note 87, at 39; Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 89, at 256-57.
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users, while also pursuing an optimal and rational strategy, like
profit maximization.95 Under this novel scenario, independent AI
traders employed by competing firms would be sufficiently
sophisticated to self-learn the best policy actions and experiment
with different strategies to optimize their (joint) cumulative
performance. Therefore, “tacit” collusion would result from
independent AI agents’ autonomous decisions, without any prior
human intent to achieve such a level of policy coordination. From
the outside, however, it will be challenging to establish whether
“coordination” as the outcome of interactions among algorithms is
the fruit of a deliberate and purposeful choice made by humans, or
rather a random or accidental consequence of using AI.
Intuitively, while all of this may appear to make sense, especially
in light of the constant progress being made in ML, it is still unclear
how urgent these risks are. After all, much will depend on what
algorithms can actually achieve regarding their ability to coordinate
behaviors by solely observing and interacting with markets and/or
through communicating protocols. 96 Before addressing these
technical specificities, it is worth investigating whether global
capital markets have shown specific segments to be suitable
economic environments for algorithmic “tacit” collusion to emerge.
Undoubtedly, as increasingly digital ecosystems, capital markets
have shown some fragilities to the risks of algorithmic disruptions,
something of which regulators seem increasingly aware. 97
However, empirical evidence on algorithmic collusion on capital
markets is practically non-existent. To assess the risks of algorithmic
tacit collusion by AI traders, we first suggest recalling those
facilitating market factors that, according to economic theory, can
generally serve as catalysts for strategy coordination between

See OECD, supra note 87, at 34.
Cf. Gal, supra note 90, at 84 (arguing that algorithms can alter the means and
dynamics of communication that is needed to reach an agreement).
97
To note, for instance, the failed attempt of the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission to regulate algorithmic trading under its jurisdiction. See
Regulation Automated Trading; Withdrawal, 85 Fed. Reg. 42755-01 (proposed Dec.
17, 2015) (withdrawn Jul. 15, 2020); see also ANDRÉA M. MAECHLER ET AL., BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, FX EXECUTION ALGORITHMS AND MARKET FUNCTIONING 2 (2020),
https://www.bis.org/publ/mktc13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TZ9P-FET2]
(reporting on the plausibility of volatility impacts due to trading execution
algorithms in global FX markets).
95
96
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competing firms without the need for explicit communication. 98
Thus, the following list recalls those facilitating factors and applies
them to capital markets to assess the likelihood of the emergence of
algorithmic-driven “tacit” collusion.
Market transparency allows firms to monitor market prices and
dynamics. Transparency facilitates the detection of deviations from
supra-competitive prices; thus, it allows for quicker retaliation,
thereby rendering collusion more sustainable. 99 The financial
services industry is notably heavily regulated and, indeed, existing
financial laws generally contain specific provisions aimed at
enhancing market transparency to safeguard several public goals
(e.g., investor protection). While financial markets’ transparency is
intended to safeguard competitive mechanisms and ensure safe
market functioning, it could also constitute a technical prerequisite
for the successful application of trading algorithms.
A higher frequency of interactions allows for faster retaliation
against cheaters. In algorithmic markets, a higher frequency of
interactions can lead to more sustainable collusive outcomes as price
adjustments become more effectively achievable, both in terms of
speed and costs.100 Unquestionably, capital markets are the fastest
and most interconnected marketplaces in the world economy where
interactions among market players can indeed take place at the
speed of light, especially in the case of more liquid financial assets
and those markets that allow for HFT.
Product homogeneity can also facilitate collusion, as it can reduce
all the efforts necessary for parties to reach collusive agreements.101
From an investor’s perspective, comparison among financial assets
is typically drawn in terms of risk-return. Under this lens, financial
instruments can therefore be considered relatively homogeneous
98
But see Ulrich Schwalbe, Algorithms, Machine Learning, and Collusion, 14
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 568, 592-96 (2019) (affirming that experimental
economics has shown the vital need for communication for algorithmic collusion
but noting, however, that most innovative ML methods based on deep learning can
help relax many practical constraints faced by competing firms’ algorithms to
coordinate, by even developing new communication protocols autonomously).
99
See MARC IVALDI, BRUNO JULLIEN, PATRICK REY, PAUL SEABRIGHT & JEAN
TIROLE, FINAL REPORT FOR DG COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE
ECONOMICS
OF
TACIT
COLLUSION
22
(2003),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_t
acit_collusion_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM3P-T66G].
100
See id. at 19-21.
101
See id. at 45-47 (arguing that collusion is more difficult when firms are
differentiated by levels of quality, while product differentiation may have an
ambiguous effect on collusion sustainability).
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products. Moreover, financial engineering creativity strengthens
this aspect. For instance, via “synthetic” financial positions, it is
possible in principle to replicate the pay-off of any financial
instrument as the combination of other financial assets.102
Market concentration is usually positively correlated to the
easiness of the sustainability of collusive agreements. As a general
rule, the higher the number of competitors, the lower the economic
incentives for rival firms to coordinate. 103 While some financial
market segments—like equity trading—are generally more
competitive than others, 104 we nevertheless observe a general
tendency toward greater market concentration levels and crossmarket linkages, especially among top global professional
players.105
Both entry barriers and innovation can impact the stability of
market concentration levels, albeit in opposite directions. Usually,
high entry barriers are perceived as a key determinant for collusion
sustainability, whereas in innovation-driven markets, collusion is
less of a concern.106 While financial laws generally aim to create a
highly competitive playing field and are technologically neutral, the
reality of global capital markets is de facto different. For instance,
entry barriers, like licensing and reputational and financial capital,
make the financial industry quite an exclusive club. While

102
A “synthetic” financial instrument aims to replicate the characteristics
(e.g., payoff) of a target financial instrument by combining two or more
conventional financial instruments.
103
See Ivaldi et al., supra note 99, at 12-15 (noting however that also firms’
asymmetric market shares may render collusion more difficult to sustain).
104
See Nicola Cetorelli, Beverly Hirtle, Donald Morgan, Stavros Peristiani, and
João Santos, Trends in Financial Market Concentration and Their Implications for Market
Stability, FED. RSRV. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 37-41 (Mar. 2007),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/07v13n1/070
3hirt.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZS4-Q9PD] (reporting a general increasing trend in
market concentration, but with inconsistencies among different U.S. market
segments).
105
Cf. Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battiston, The Network of
Global
Corporate
Control,
PLOS
ONE
4
(Oct.
2011),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0025995
[https://perma.cc/469D-37QR] (providing evidence about an “economic superentity,” formed by major global financial institutions, and its international
ownership network).
106
Ivaldi et al., supra note 99, at 16-18, 32-35.
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potentially disruptive for competition, innovation is generally
successfully monitored by incumbent firms through acquisitions.107
All in all, these market factors can serve as determinants for
“tacit” collusion in a repeated pricing game under oligopolistic
settings. In addition, delegating decision-making to algorithms can
relax many of the constraints faced by competing firms to reach
some level of coordination, without any need for direct
communication.108 Mainly, algorithms can serve as a decisive factor
for coordination, as they create advantages in speed and analytical
sophistication vis-à-vis traditional human-managed cartels.109
Besides, thanks to continuous achievements being recorded in
ML methods, which also allow for the best use of Big Data, selflearning algorithms can add a further layer of complexity.
Autonomous AI agents could lead to new forms of cartel-like
infringements, and they may also change the type of communication
needed to reach an illicit agreement or the same market effects in
economic terms. For instance, when algorithms become transparent
enough to each other, they could easily find ways to coordinate by
predicting rivals’ future strategies. 110 Hence, to the extent that
specific market segments within the complex network of global
capital markets show some of those facilitating factors, these
segments might more likely be exposed to algorithmic “tacit”
collusion risks. However, it is still unclear whether, and effectively
how, independent AI traders could achieve some forms of
coordination without any direct human guidance. Moreover, the
role of communication among independent pricing algorithms
seems crucial to reaching and sustaining coordination. 111 In this
regard, recent findings from both theoretical and experimental
economics of algorithmic collusion can help us to shed some light
on the theoretical feasibility of AI-style forms of “tacit” collusion.

107
See, e.g., Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W Arner & Janos N.
Barberis, From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance,
14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 393, 402 (2018) (arguing that incumbent firms have been
gradually facing greater competitive challenges given the increasing number and
variety of new entrants into the financial sectors).
108
See OECD, supra note 87, at 24-32 (describing four scenarios in which the
use of algorithms by competing firms might increase the risks of tacit collusion,
including: (i) monitoring algorithms, (ii) parallel algorithms, (iii) signaling
algorithms, and (iv) self-learning algorithms).
109
E.g., Gal, supra note 90, at 78-79.
110 Gal, supra note 90, at 85.
111
See Schwalbe, supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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“Reinforcement Learning” and Algorithmic Collusion

Economic research on algorithmic collusion uses game theory
approaches to investigate the likelihood of algorithmic cooperative
behaviors to occur in oligopolistic market settings. 112 Albeit
employing quite basic algorithms, a recent theoretical study has
attracted tremendous scholarly interest because of its spectacular
findings. In a duopoly with homogeneous products, whenever
pricing algorithms can decode their rivals’ strategies and thus revise
and align strategies in response, collusion is the inevitable
outcome.113 However, these findings are suggestive, and one should
take them with a grain of salt. Due to the simplistic assumptions on
which they are based, these findings can hardly explain the behavior
of adversarial algorithms and their interactions in real-life settings,
let alone provide sound evidence about algorithmic collusion and
its likelihood within the complex network of global capital
markets.114 In particular, the ability to decode rivals’ algorithmic
strategies might not be a well-suited hypothesis for real markets,
which are notoriously noisy. In addition, as the sophistication of
algorithms can also lead to “black box” problems for their
developers and users, it is hitherto not known whether investment
firms can utilize algorithms to reverse-engineer their rivals’ trading
strategies to reach coordination.115 Indeed, it is not clear yet whether
some sort of communication among algorithms is ultimately
necessary to achieve collusive-like outcomes among independent
and competing algorithms.
A recent wave of published works in experimental economics
helps us to develop a better understanding of algorithmic tacit
collusion by RL-based agents in oligopolistic markets. Findings
from computational economics studies have long supported the
112
For an exhaustive literature review on economic studies applying game
theory frameworks to the analysis of algorithmic collusion, see Schwalbe, supra note
98, at 580-90 (reviewing the most relevant findings from the computer science,
theoretical, and experimental economics literature).
113
See Bruno Salcedo, Pricing Algorithms and Tacit Collusion 7-19 (Nov. 1,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author),
http://www.gtcenter.org/Archive/2016/Conf/Salcedo2451.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YA2-UEKE] (providing first theoretical evidence about pricing
algorithms as an effective tool to achieve “tacit” collusion).
114
See Schwalbe, supra note 98, at 591-92 (noting however that increasingly
capable self-learning algorithms might learn over time how to coordinate behavior
autonomously).
115
See Schwalbe, supra note 98, at 589.
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hypothesis that, in the context of a duopoly, independent RL-based
agents can achieve some collusive outcomes in a sequential pricing
game.116 More recently, in-lab experiments have produced further
and more convincing insights about the relationship between
algorithms’ need for communication and “tacit” collusion.
Importantly, they have explored risks of algorithmic “tacit”
collusion by competing AI agents, without them being expressly
programmed to attempt to reach coordination as an optimal
strategy. 117 These studies have achieved some promising results
that undoubtedly contribute to expanding our knowledge about RL
agents and algorithmic collusion under different oligopolistic
settings. Most of these researchers employ “Q-learning” 118
algorithms, a specific sub-category of RL-based agents. One such
research shows that, in a duopoly setting, when rival firms engage
in a sequential pricing game and employ independent Q-learning
agents, the latter, while under competitive pressure, can
nevertheless learn to approximate profitable fixed-prices or produce
asymmetric price cycles, 119 two outcomes usually observable in
those markets suffering from “tacit” collusion. 120 Another recent
study has looked at algorithmic collusion beyond the duopoly
context and produced further promising insights about Q-learning

116
See Gerald Tesauro & Jeffrey O. Kephart, Pricing in Agent Economies Using
Multi-Agent Q-Learning, 5 AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTI-AGENT SYS. 289, 295 (2002)
(assuming however that competing firms’ pricing algorithms need to enjoy, by
default, the ability to “read” rivals’ strategies in order to achieve some form of
coordination).
117
Cf. Schwalbe, supra note 98, at 591 (highlighting the limitations of in-lab
research studying the collusive behavior of algorithms in simulated environments).
118
”Q-learning” is a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm (i.e., “criticonly” approach) and it is among the most used ML methods to solve optimization
problems in finance. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 27, at 4-19 (providing a
comprehensive introduction to “critic-only” approaches, as well as an exhaustive
review on studies employing Q-learning algorithms for solving different financial
trading problems).
119
See Timo Klein, Autonomous Algorithmic Collusion: Q-Learning Under
Sequential
Pricing,
RAND
J.
ECON.
(forthcoming
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3195812
[https://perma.cc/G4WF-ZLCD] (demonstrating nevertheless that, not only do
algorithms’ properties matter, but also the specific features of the market
environment in which they operate).
120
Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price
Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles, 56 ECONOMETRICA 571, 592
(1988).
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algorithms. 121 Independent Q-learning pricing algorithms have
proved capable of systematically learning to collude by “trial and
error,” while also pursuing a profit-maximizing objective without
requiring any previous knowledge about the environment in which
they operate.122
Indeed, the recent interest in RL agents’ ability to collude under
different market settings is also a signal of growing concerns among
scholars brought about by constant achievements being made in ML
methods and the prospect of their real-life application one day
leading to social harm.
Scientifically, the findings from
experimental economics have contributed to shedding some light on
the relationship between deep RL agents and algorithmic collusion.
Importantly, these studies have highlighted one main barrier for AI
agents to reach and sustain cartel-like outcomes under real market
settings: i.e., the ability to communicate and share strategic
information.123 On the one hand, the problems with the validity of
the earliest studies on RL agents rest on assuming algorithmic
communication by default. On the other, the validity of the most
recent in-lab experiments, especially those investigating Q-learning
methods, is limited in scope by excessively stylized assumptions
about real markets. Therefore, they would struggle to suit the
complex reality of global capital markets. For instance, in complex
and fast-moving environments like financial markets, independent
and competing AI trading systems could find it hard to coordinate
strategies with rivals to reach supra-competitive price levels by
simply monitoring markets and adapting their own strategies to
observed phenomena. Ultimately, some forms of algorithmic
communication might still be necessary. However, it is unclear
whether and how increasingly capable AI traders would
121
See Emilio Calvano, Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò, and Sergio
Pastorello, Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, 110 AM. ECON.
REV. 3267, 3294-96 (2020) (studying the colluding behavior of Q-learning agents in
an oligopoly model of repeated price competition).
122
Id. at 3295-96 (affirming, however, that more research is needed to confirm
the robustness of these early findings, as the external validity of most in-lab
experiments is challenged by the realism of markets’ settings).
123
See Ashwin Ittoo & Nicolas Petit, Algorithmic Pricing Agents and Tacit
Collusion: A Technological Perspective, in L’INTELLIGENCE ARTIFICIELLE ET LE DROIT
[ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE LAW] 241, 253-56 (Hervé Jacquemin & Alexandre
De Streel eds., 2017) (highlighting five main reinforcement learning agents’
technological challenges that would defuse the algorithmic tacit collusion
conjecture, including: (i) preference specification; (ii) formalization of the
environment and the data problem; (iii) non-stationary agents and preference
construction; (iv) scalability; and (v) exploration versus exploitation trade-off).
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communicate by just observing and populating financial markets.124
Alternatively, autonomous AI traders could also find other
innovative ways to communicate and coordinate with their
algorithmic competitors without any prior human intent. 125
Looking to the future, continuous technological achievements,
specifically in DRL methods for autonomous agents, could alleviate
many of the challenges currently faced by algorithms with respect
to achieving “tacit” collusion.126 Nevertheless, as tacit collusion is a
problem of coordination, it is yet to be seen whether the widespread
adoption of increasingly capable and autonomous AI agents will
lead to emerging risks of algorithmic collusion regardless of explicit
communication.
Pertinently, capital markets are essentially different from other
marketplaces. Yet, even a tiny and modest price effect incurred by
algorithmic manipulation or collusion can have substantial effects
and potentially result in significant extra profits for malicious actors
and generate a considerable deadweight loss for other market
participants.127 Consequently, it seems necessary to explore where,
among specific segments, algorithmic collusion risks might find the
most conducive techno-economic environment to emerge on global
capital markets. Indeed, because of their operational features, some
market segments might be, to some extent, more prone to risks of
algorithmic tacit collusion than others.

124
See Schwalbe, supra note 98, at 594 (“[T]he question arises whether
algorithms can communicate with each other or whether different algorithms might
even be able to learn to communicate without being explicitly programmed, that is,
without a common communication protocol.”).
125
Schwalbe, supra note 98, at 596:
[T]he development of algorithms that can learn to communicate
with each other seems to be in its very early stages. Although it
remains unclear which types of communication among
algorithms might arise in the future, for now different pricing
algorithms should not expected to be able to communicate with
each other . . . or . . . to decode other algorithms and achieve
collusion.
126
See Schwalbe, supra note 98, at 596; see also Ittoo & Petit, supra note 123, at
256.
127
Calvano et al., supra note 121, at 3294.
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Case Studies

Assessing risks of algorithmic “tacit” collusion on capital
markets is not an easy task, especially considering the high
complexity of these markets compared to those of other economic
sectors. However, without pretending to be exhaustive, this section
considers possible global capital markets segments that, primarily
because of their operational functioning and institutional
organization, could facilitate autonomous AI trading systems’
achievement and sustainment of cartel-like outcomes. Specifically,
we look at “quote-driven” markets and “financial benchmarks.”
“Quote-driven” markets are characterized by a relatively
concentrated number of designed professionals (i.e., market makers)
responsible for continuously posting their “bids” and “ask” quotes
that they are willing to accept. For instance, suppose that in some
quite-oligopolistic settings, competing firms use trading algorithms
to conduct their market-making activities.128 In addition, they can
directly trade with their competitors (i.e., other market-makers) to
finance their liquidity, thus they can also monitor their rivals’
pricing strategies via digital interfaces.129 One could suppose that,
under conducive conditions, the use of autonomous AI trading
systems (e.g., based on DRL methods) by competing firms might
lead to risky scenarios whenever they would be able to achieve
supra-competitive price equilibria through their market
observations and interactions, as part of a rational and inevitable
optimal strategy. To illustrate how “tacit” collusion could emerge,
one could expect increasingly capable AI agents to find ways to
solve the game theory problem of algorithmic coordination in an
optimized fashion, absent any direct communication. Consider, for
instance, the so-called “tit-for-tat” strategy, which prescribes an
agent to cooperate on the first move, and then follow whatever
128
Cf. Olivier Guéant & Iuliia Manziuk, Deep Reinforcement Learning for Market
Making in Corporate Bonds: Beating the Curse of Dimensionality, 26 APPLIED
MATHEMATICAL FIN. 387, 388 (2019) (proposing an ensemble deep reinforcement
learning strategy for market-making activities to approximate the optimal bid and
ask quotes over a large number of bonds).
129
Cf. WORLD BANK, ELECTRONIC TRADING PLATFORMS IN GOVERNMENT
SECURITIES MARKETS: BACKGROUND NOTE 15, 20-22 (World Bank, Working Paper,
Nov. 2013) http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24098 [https://perma.cc/U7S3-72R2]
(describing the different trading strategies employed by market makers, which also
trade among themselves to finance their liquidity positions and manage their
inventories).
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opponents do on the previous move.130 Embedded with the ability
to switch to this strategy whenever, by reinforcement learning,
competing AI agents may expect rival strategies to seek
coordination. AI can arguably offer a strategy alternative to explicit
forms of coordination.
Meanwhile, “financial benchmarks” can also represent an
attractive and favorable target for colluding parties.131 Considering
their fundamental role as reference values for the pricing of several
other financial assets, regulators worldwide have started adopting
specific legal frameworks to deal with benchmark manipulation and
collusion risks. 132 Traditionally, benchmark submissions have
involved communications being made by contributing firms.
Today, the tendency among regulators is to move to transactionbased benchmark calculations, determined by contributions based
on specific transactions by a selected small set of large market
participants. Still, even under the new settings, economic theory
suggests that competing firms may still operate a benchmark rate
cartel even when their business interests are not fully aligned.
Specifically, whenever they can create and share inside information
to reduce conflicts of interest among their portfolio expositions and
can also engage in eligible transaction rigging, benchmark collusion
is possible.133 The widespread adoption of increasingly capable AI
agents could relax many of these constraints; particularly,
competing AI traders could coordinate without any explicit need to
share inside information via traditional communication media
130
Cf. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation,
211 SCIENCE 1390 (showing theoretically and confirming it with a computer
tournament how cooperative behaviors based on reciprocity can get started within
a social environment, evolve while interacting with other strategies, and become
resilient once established).
131
See Verstein, supra note 81, at 217, 250.
132
For instance, the EU has introduced a specific regulation to protect
financial benchmarks that came into effect on 1 January 2018 (EU Benchmark
Regulation). See Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 June 2016 on Indices Used as Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and
Financial Contracts or to Measure the Performance of Investment Funds and
Amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No
596/2014, 2016 O.J. (L 171), 1-65.
133
Cf. Nuria Boot, Timo Klein & Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Collusive Benchmark
Rates Fixing 3-4 (Amsterdam L. Sch. Legal Stud., Rsch. Paper No. 2017-34, June
2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2993096
[https://perma.cc/S9TZ-7FBQ]
(showing theoretically that collusive benchmark rate fixing is possible whenever:
(i) collusive parties can share information to adjust their respective exposure to the
rate ahead of the market, and (ii) they can also engage in costly manipulation to
support the joint-profit maximizing rate).
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thanks to DL methods. Whenever this becomes the case, AI traders
could share strategic information for coordination purposes by
solely observing and interacting on markets’ electronic books.
Alternatively, one could even wonder whether increasingly capable
AI agents would autonomously develop new communicating
protocols to coordinate with rivals’ algorithms in ways that humans
might not expect or even be able to notice.
At least theoretically, some AI applications have the capacity to
lead to some social harm, the extent of which remains to be
observed. At the same time, both market conduct and competition
authorities are increasingly affected by a knowledge gap vis-à-vis
algorithms’ behaviors and their interactions.
Importantly,
supervisory authorities and prosecutors risk lacking sound
enforcement toolkits to deal with new forms of algorithmic “tacit”
collusion. All of this adds notably to public authorities’ well-known
limitations in jurisdictional and methodo-technological expertise
when it comes to generally detecting market abuse in increasingly
fast, interconnected, and complex digital marketplaces.
IV. THE “BLACK BOX” PROBLEM AND GAPS IN THE EXISTING MARKET
ABUSE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
The emergence of autonomous trading algorithms and their
potential foray into abusive market practices triggers questions with
regard to the regulatory response. As we will see below, when
constraining instances of algorithmic market abuse, even the most
advanced legal systems still rely on somewhat outdated normative
assumptions that ultimately address human behaviors and hold
them accountable for how their algorithms misbehave on markets.
As such, legal frameworks are at a gradually increasing risk of
failing to regulate algorithms’ market behavior comprehensively.134
As discussed above, increasingly capable and autonomous AI
traders can expose markets to new risks. Whenever market abuse
involves autonomous AI traders, operating as “black boxes” (e.g.,
by DRL), severe short-circuits in the safe application of market abuse
134
See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (2016) (arguing that existing liability rules governing securities
trading are increasingly unable to protect against algorithmic market disruptions);
see also Scopino, supra note 62, at 293 (noting that enforcement authorities would be
at best able to ascertain major technical violations as opposed to ascertain the
existence of a manipulative behavior).
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rules can eventually arise. Specifically, AI may subvert established
market conduct rules providing for detection, liability attribution,
and other enforcement mechanisms. However, in what follows, our
emphasis is on how autonomous AI traders can bypass traditional
liability rules and concepts (e.g., “intent,” “causation,” and
“negligence”) and to which extent the “black box” problem hinders
enforcement actions.
a. Sanctioning Algorithmic Market Abuse: The Three Basic Scenarios
Enforcement authorities face increasing operational challenges
to constantly monitor trading activities and effectively detect
algorithmic market abuse. This is especially the case for cross-asset
and cross-market manipulative strategies.135 Notwithstanding these
difficulties in market surveillance, the practice of algorithmic agency
generally raises fundamental legal questions about liability
attribution.
Depending on the actual degree of autonomy,
algorithms may cause unforeseeable and severe disruptions to
capital markets’ safety and integrity according to three basic
scenarios, each of which are presented as follows.
i.

Operational Failure

Algorithmic-driven market disruptions can be an unintended
consequence of using algorithms to automate trading tasks. Under
this first and very basic scenario fall cases like Knight Capital’s
spectacular operational failure in 2012 on the New York Stock
Exchange. The investment firm, which went bankrupt after causing
markets to flash crash, was responsible for an out-of-control
automated routing system used to execute trades that caused
massive pressure and disorder on several stocks’ prices. As soon as
the defective trading software was fixed, already it had accumulated
around $460 million in losses, pushing the investment firm on the
135
See, e.g., IOSCO, supra note 79, at 23-29 (highlighting the need for
supervisory cooperation among all market stakeholders to deal effectively with
cross-market and cross-border manipulations); see also Janet Austin, Protecting
Market Integrity in an Era of Fragmentation and Cross-Border Trading, 46 OTTAWA L.
REV. 25 (2014) (discussing recent developments in global capital markets’ structure
led by algorithmic trading and their implication for regulators and supervisors to
safeguard market integrity).
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brink of bankrupt before being acquired by a competitor.136 When
market disruptions are the result of such unintended consequences
of using algorithms—like a system “bug” or any other operational
failure— 137 enforcement authorities still have access to the
appropriate legal concepts and tools to address liability issues.138
ii.

Conscious Use by Humans

Market disruptions can also result from algorithms that are
consciously crafted and employed by humans for unlawful
purposes. In these cases, algorithmic market abuse is “by-design.”
Algorithms’ ability to manipulate markets or coordinate behavior
can either be embedded originally “in-the-code” or result from
subsequent training processes. Human experts can teach, from
historical examples or within simulated market environments, AI
traders how to “discover” manipulation while also guaranteeing the
pursuit of a profit-maximizing business goal.139 The very first case
of prosecution for HFT manipulation by U.S. authorities in 2014 is a
striking example of humans creating trading algorithms with the
specific intent to manipulate markets. Between June and December
2009, Athena Capital, a proprietary HFT firm active in the U.S. equity
markets, used its bandit algorithm Gravy to manipulate explicitly,
by trading in books’ order imbalances, the closing prices of
thousands of publicly listed stocks on the NASDAQ, the second
largest U.S. stock exchange. The firm was able to ensure itself a
dominant position on equity markets, even if only for the last few
seconds in the trading day, and this was enough to allow it to extract
extra profits.140 From an enforcement perspective, cases under this
Yadav, supra note 134, at 1047.
For a critical account of how algorithmic-decision making can expose
society to new risks whenever implemented carelessly, see generally CATHY O’NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND
THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016).
138
Cf. Yadav, supra note 134, at 1079 (arguing that interactions and correlation
between different algorithms can frustrate enforcement actions).
139
But see Mizuta, supra note 68, at 410-11 (claiming that AI trading agents can
autonomously discover market manipulation as an optimal investment strategy via
“online” learning on markets, whereas they cannot achieve the same results by
learning with back testing since it does not duly consider liquidity constraints).
140
According to the SEC decision, Athena Capital was guilty of violating Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and agreed to pay a $1 million
136
137
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second category are less easy to deal with. Enforcement action can
consume considerable resources and be limited in scope by public
authorities’ skills and technological capabilities, which notoriously
lag behind those of major players within the financial industry.141
After all, to punish unlawful market behavior, prosecutors and
plaintiffs alike must successfully prove convincing and compelling
evidence of the scienter (i.e., intent or other relevant mental state) of
humans employing manipulative algorithms.142
iii.

Autonomous AI Decision-Making

Market abuse by autonomous AI traders represents the third
and most challenging scenario. As discussed in Section III,
autonomous AI traders can pave the way for new forms of
algorithmic market abuse, including old and new market
manipulation techniques and risks of “tacit” collusion. These forms
of market abuse are also the trickiest for enforcement authorities.
Unlike more deterministic AI systems, autonomous AI traders can
discover, by self-learning, trading strategies beyond what was
originally intended and reasonably foreseeable by human experts.
This equates to the “black box” problem (i.e., the inability to either
fully understand the AI decision-making process itself or assess the
validity of its outcomes). While we would expect both human
creators and users to be aware of the limits of their complex AI tools
or even their different components, as well as the quality of the data
(in terms of statistical representativeness, bias, etc.), they could be
nevertheless unable to fully understand or justify why and how
their algorithms have reached a specific trading decision. Arguably,
this can be particularly the case for those trading systems that
employ deep learning due to the well-known intrinsic opacity of the
“black box.”143 In fact, while DL methods’ “black box” nature allows
for powerful optimizations, their outcomes and behaviors can be
administrative fine. See In the Matter of Athena Capital Research, LLC No. 3-16199
(SEC Oct. 16, 2014).
141
See, e.g., LO, supra note 7, at 358-60 (noting that U.S. authorities needed
more than six years to prosecute against Mr. Navinder Sarao for “spoofing” trading,
as found responsible for contributing to the May 2010 Flash Crash).
142
On the legal problem of proving human intent behind algorithmic trading
and manipulation, see Yadav, supra note 134, at 1073-76; Scopino, supra note 62, at
255-57.
143
E.g., Bathaee, supra note 84, at 901-03.
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opaque. DL methods can thus lead to transparency concerns. 144
From a compliance perspective, technical and legal issues arising
from a lack of AI transparency are often framed in terms of the
“explainability” of AI financial decision-making. 145 Indeed, the
ability to explain algorithms’ outcomes and decisions becomes
prominent with regard to liability issues for AI wrongdoing, as
enforcement authorities will need to ascertain liability by
considering the specific contribution of several individuals within
an investment firm in order to guarantee effective enforcement and
deterrence. Undoubtedly, specific autonomous AI agents’ “black
box” nature adds another layer of complexity for the safe application
of liability rules. As discussed below, fundamental legal concepts
for liability attribution can cease to function in a safe and proper
manner.
b. The Failure of Existing Liability Rules
To punish market abuse, most legal systems generally require—
more or less explicitly—that enforcement authorities prove, with
documented
evidence,
the
manipulator’s
or
conspirator’s scienter (i.e., “intent” or other relevant mental state) to
cause harm, in order to impose any criminal or civil liability. 146
However, the law attributes liability to individuals or legal persons
(i.e., investment firms) for acts or omissions committed by a natural
person (i.e., employees). This applies to both market abuse
regulations and antitrust laws’ enforcement.
As a first attempt, one may wonder whether it would be
reasonable to attribute liability to AI itself.
Unfortunately,
jurisdictions at present do not recognize algorithms as a separate
144
Cf. Lipton, supra note 36 (discussing the trade-off between model accuracy
and explainability and arguing that different stakeholders can interpret the latter in
very different ways).
145
See supra notes 34, 36-39 and 54 and accompanying text.
146
Except for fraud-based manipulations, in which cases also a negligence test
could suffice to incriminate malicious actors under contractual obligations. The
“intent” element for liability attributions has fueled an intense debate among legal
scholars, trying to investigate both the economic and legal essences of the
prohibition of market manipulation. For the U.S. case, see supra note 62. For the
EU, see Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Article 12 Market Manipulation, in EUR. FIN. SERVS.
L. 736, 749 (Matthias Lehmann & Christoph Kumpan eds., 2019). For an Australian
perspective, see Hui Huang, Redefining Market Manipulation in Australia: The Role of
an Implied Intent Element, 27 COMP’Y & SEC. L.J. 8 (2007).
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legal personality, despite some academic proposals to do so.147 After
all, it is conceptually hard to impute intention on the same AI agents
since AI has no consciousness or free will as can be attributed to
humans. Thus, the critical issue here is establishing legal liability in
connection with AI misconduct.148 As a starting point, one should
analyze the matter by determining responsibility within the
organization employing AI. In principle, there could be several
individuals potentially liable, including those with organizational
responsibility (e.g., board members such as a CIO or CTO, who
decide upon the proliferation and application of AI-related projects),
and those with the expertise necessary for the creation,
development, use, and maintenance of an investment firm’s
proprietary AI trading tools. In fact, all of them might be somehow
partly accountable for AI misbehavior to some extent. Besides, as
courts cannot prosecute AI agents per se, they could alternatively
consider AI as a simple device in humans’ hands.149 Does this mean
that we should always treat AI as mere technology? Or still, given
AI’s increasingly autonomous nature, should the law hold AI liable
itself? As real AI applications for financial trading are still
somewhat hybrid human-AI systems, following the “human-in-theloop” paradigm, the key question is where to draw the line. Sadly
enough, enforcement authorities will probably face increasing
difficulties in prosecuting cases of market abuse against an
organization or its employees by relying on traditional intent-based
tests, because the relevant state of mind has to be found within the
opaque components and processes of AI. Precisely, by detaching
decision-making from those individuals that the law can ultimately
reach, AI agency represents an attempt at safe and effective law
enforcement as well as deterrence.
AI agency also raises concerns about the safe application of
traditional tort law’s legal tests, based on the concept of
“causation.”150 Notably, causation inquiries need to determine the
causal link between the concerned practice and the alleged harm
(e.g., financial loss), not least to assess the scope of liability. For
147
See, e.g., John Lightbourne, Algorithms & Fiduciaries: Existing and Proposed
Regulatory Approaches to Artificially Intelligent Financial Planners, 67 DUKE L.J. 651
(2017) (proposing to grant legal personhood to the case of AI robo-advisor and
make them subject to the same liability regime of human advisors based on
fiduciary standards).
148
See, e.g., King, supra note 6, at 108-10; Bathaee, supra note 84, at 906-07.
149
See discussion supra in Section IV.A.
150
E.g., Bathaee, supra note 84, at 922.
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instance, “foreseeability” can find no safe application.151 This legal
doctrine ensures that liability can arise only for what is reasonably
foreseeable by alleged parties. It thus requires enforcement
authorities to ask whether a reasonable person could have foreseen
the effects of alleged conduct to determine whether it would count
as an offense. Undoubtedly, autonomous AI agents can break the
chain in causation between the wrongdoing and the caused
economic losses. On their part, prosecutors face several challenges
in establishing the required link. From a legal viewpoint, the
question is which outcomes and behaviors can be reasonably
foreseeable.
To make matters worse, not only enforcement authorities but
also human experts who are involved in creating, developing, using,
and maintaining AI cannot always foresee a priori the ways in which
“black box” AI trading behaves. Therefore, it is difficult to apply the
legal concept of “negligence.”152 A person is found negligent when
he/she fails to take reasonable care to avoid harmful consequences
from his/her action, even though he/she could and should have
taken measures of due care. To illustrate the complexity of the
challenges posed by AI trading with respect to the aforementioned
legal concepts, market abuse by AI can be due to several
contingencies. For instance, an AI market abuse can merely be the
outcome of counter-intuitive computational reasoning, an
extrapolation of very latent patterns by ANNs’ analytical
capabilities, or even the exploitation of strategies that human traders
could not even conceive. 153 Moreover, the speed at which these
systems operate, together with the ways algorithms interact with
each other, can not only create contagion effects but may further
complicate any foreseeability legal test.
Overall, autonomous AI is inherently prone to jeopardizing and
undermining established prohibitions of market abuse, specifically
traditional liability rules. Enforcement authorities are called upon
to assess liability among a long list of possible individuals, but this
can only be possible through knowing their exact contributions to

151
See Bathaee supra note 84 at 922-25 (discussing the interplay between the
safe application of the “foreseeability” legal concept and the “black box” nature of
specific AI methods).
152
See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 134, at 1077-82 (discussing the difficulties for
prosecutors in relying on the “negligence” test, especially in enforcing against HFT
strategies).
153
See Bathaee, supra note 84, at 924.
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the AI misconduct. 154 In this context, the “black box” nature of
specific AI applications can easily bypass existing legal
frameworks.155 “Black box” AI trading could ultimately render the
global financial system vulnerable to malicious actors
“externalizing” to other market participants the costs of their
misconducts. 156 We should note, however, that the above legal
concerns are not entirely new. Algorithms, including deterministic
ones from years or decades ago, could already act independently
and behave in unpredictable ways, especially when interacting and
competing with rivals’ algorithms.157 However, truly autonomous
AI adds a further layer of complexity. To the extent that
autonomous AI is a “black box,” the safe application of liability rules
against market abuse can be severely impaired. Legal concepts such
as “intent” and “causation” will most of the time fail to provide a
sound conceptual legal framework for authorities to enforce market
conduct rules. Distinguishing whether AI misconduct results from
an unintended consequence, inspired by some prior human intent,
or autonomous AI decision-making will be increasingly challenging.
As such, the matter has to be put on the interdisciplinary research
agenda bridging financial law, economics, and informatics.
c. An Already “Outdated” Regime of Algorithmic Governance?
Global regulators and supervisors monitor carefully marketdriven innovation in AI trading to assess the need to upgrade their
legal frameworks. Notably, the governance of algorithmic trading
is subject to some lex specialis in most advanced jurisdictions. 158
However, in dealing with specific AI trading methods, even the
154
AI is always bound to algorithms, which are coded to work as software on
some sort of hardware (from desktops up to platforms in the cloud).
155
E.g., Bathaee, supra note 84, at 919; see also supra note 56.
156
See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 134, at 1039, 1083.
157
E.g., Wendell Wallach, Implementing Moral Decision Making Faculties in
Computers and Robots, 22 AI & SOC’Y 463, 464 (2008) (“Computers already operate
independent of direct human supervision and make decisions that can’t be
predicated by their designers or programmers.”).
158
The present section mainly builds on the EU financial law as an illustrative
example, as being considered the most comprehensive legal system on algorithmic
trading and its governance. In the U.S., algorithmic trading is regulated by both
the Securities Exchange Commission and the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory organisation intended to regulate member
investment firms and exchange markets. See FINRA RULE 3110 and RULE 3120.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/2

2021] Machine Learning, Market Manipulation, and Collusion

123

most advanced legal systems appear somewhat “outdated” as the
technology evolves. Both the regulatory framework for algorithmic
trading and market abuse enforcement mechanisms have some
shortcomings.159
First, firms using algorithmic trading need to comply with
specific requirements. 160 Importantly, they need to notify their
algorithmic systems and strategies to both trading venues and
competent authorities, and, upon request, provide to the latter
information about their trading systems and controls, 161 with
additional burdens for those firms conducting HFT or marketmaking activities.162 Whenever those strategies involve increasingly
autonomous AI trading that constitutes a “black box,” it is uncertain
whether supervisors enjoy the knowledge and expertise necessary
for the proper oversight of algorithmic trading. Moreover, the law
prescribes a set of organizational requirements to assist firms in
compliance with market conduct rules, emphasizing the critical
scope of enterprise risk management. Among those, focus should
be placed on specific provisions regarding the “testing,”
“validation,” and “deployment” of algorithmic trading strategies.163
However, as the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
recently highlighted in its revision report on the governance of
algorithmic trading in the EU markets, regulators still rely upon the
annual self-assessment report filled by the same supervisees as a
base to ascertain their compliance. Now, it can be doubtful as to
whether this mere state of compliance can really accommodate the
increasingly sophisticated and “black box” nature of specific ML
methods for financial trading (e.g., DRL). In this regard, the ESMA
is considering the policy option to introduce a real due diligence
159
But see Peter Georg Picht & Gaspare Tazio Loderer, Framing Algorithms:
Competition Law and (Other) Regulatory Tools, 42 WORLD COMPETITION 391 (2019)
(arguing that financial regulation is one area of law that have successfully
implemented rules and procedures to deal with issues arising from algorithms).
160
Id. at 395.
161
For the EU case, see Council Directive 2014/65/EU, art. 17 para. 2 of May
15, 2014, on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC
and Directive 2011/61/EU, O.J. (L173/349) [hereinafter MiFID II].
162
For the EU case, see MiFID II, supra note 161, art. 16 para. 6 (general
algorithmic trading requirements), art. 17 para. 2 subpara. 5 (HFT-specific
requirements), art. 48 para. 10 (flagging of algorithms).
163
In the EU, these provisions are contained in Level 2 regulation. See
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/589 of 19 July 2016 supplementing
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard
to regulatory technical standards specifying the organizational requirements of
investment firms engage in algorithmic trading.
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process, not least to address many of these technical challenges
regarding compliance. 164 Next, to mitigate market abuse risks,
investment firms are expected to invest in some precautionary
measures to counter the occurrence of unintended outcomes. Those
remedies mainly include investments in internal systems and
controls to monitor and mitigate risks from algorithmic trading.165
But those can be hard to implement effectively, as they are
notoriously costly and require high-level human expertise.166 Thus,
it is doubtful whether firms employing autonomous AI trading
would always take all the necessary precautionary steps to be
compliant.167 Malicious market actors may be incentivized to use or
discover abusive AI trading strategies, especially if these can assure
them significant “alpha” (i.e., excess return due to the strategy) and
do not expose firms to unaffordable legal and reputational risks.
Second, trading venues hosting algorithmic trading have some
legal requirements to fulfill, including arrangements on trading
systems’ operational resilience, 168 circuit-breakers to moderate
extreme volatility,169 and electronic trading. 170 In this last regard,
venues operators are called upon to cooperate with investment firms
on aspects concerning algorithmic trading’s conformity to market
conduct rules, by providing, for instance, simulation environments
to test algorithmic strategies. 171 Arguably, the fact that both
investment firms and trading venues are required to prove
164
Cf. EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER: MIFID II/MIFIR
REVIEW REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC TRADING 40 (2020) [hereinafter ESMA].
165
For the EU, see MiFID II, supra note 161, art. 17 para. 1. For the U.S., see
FINRA RULES 3110.
166
See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Douglas Arner, Ross Buckley & Brian W. Tang,
Artificial Intelligence in Finance: Putting the Human in the Loop, 43 SYDNEY L. REV. 43
(2021).
167
Cf. FINRA, Regulatory Notice 15-09 on Effective Supervision and Control
Practices for Firms Engaging in Algorithmic Trading Strategies (Mar. 2015),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/notices/15-09 [https://perma.cc/U5W6XKMZ] (“[I]n addition to specific requirements imposed on trading activity, firms
have a fundamental obligation generally to supervise their trading activity to
ensure that the activity does not violate any applicable FINRA rule, provision of the
federal securities laws or any rule thereunder.”).
168
For the EU case, see MiFID II, supra note 161, art. 48 para. 4.
169
For the EU case, see MiFID II, supra note 161, art. 48 para. 5.
170
For the EU case, see MiFID II, supra note 161, art. 48 paras. 6-10.
171
See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/584 of 14 July 2016
supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying organizational
requirements of trading venues.
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compliance through a self-assessment report does not seem entirely
appropriate to deal with specific AI trading strategies of an
autonomous nature.172 Besides, in the oversight of market conduct
rules, trading venues assume delegated supervisory tasks and need
to have systems in place for market surveillance. 173 However, as
watchdogs, they can face some incentive dilemmas. For obvious
commercial reasons, they may not be sufficiently incentivized to
conduct rigid screening on algorithms and market surveillance,
especially when facing highly competitive pressure from other
venues seeking to attract customers.174 Furthermore, the possibility
of an algorithmic trading firm being the operator of a trading venue
(e.g., a dark pool operator) may give rise to conflict-of-interest
concerns,175 which could affect market surveillance. Another critical
limitation of the current supervisory architecture is its limited scope
for cross-market surveillance, which can indeed be a source of
supervisory failure.176
Finally, apart from some essential regulatory competences,
market conduct authorities usually have a relatively marginal role
in market surveillance. In the enforcement of market rules, they
generally rely on close collaboration with regulated market
participants, from which they receive warnings and information
about possible infringements. 177 With increasing market and
172
Cf. FINRA Rules 3110 (Supervision); cf. also ESMA, supra note 164, at 44
paras. 142-45.
173
See Janet Austin, Unusual Trade or Market Manipulation? How Market Abuse
is Detected by Securities Regulators, Trading Venues and Self-Regulatory Organizations,
1 J. FIN. REG. 263, 266-74 (2015) (discussing market surveillance arrangements in
some of the most advanced jurisdictions).
174
See Yesha Yadav, Oversight Failure in Securities Markets, 104 CORNELL L. REV.
101, 104, 130-43 (2019) (arguing that market fragmentation and high competition
between trading venues represent a barrier to effective oversight of market conduct
rules); see also Austin, supra note 135, at 34 (discussing how the privatization of stock
exchanges has led to greater conflicts of interest challenges).
175
See Danny Busch, MiFID II: Regulating High Frequency Trading, Other Forms
of Algorithmic Trading and Direct Electronic Market Access, 10 L. & FIN. MKTS. REV. 72,
75 (2016) (commenting the risk on the EU markets); see also Stanislav Dolgopolov,
Legal Liability for Fraud in the Evolving Architecture of Securities Markets, in GLOBAL
ALGORITHMIC CAPITAL MARKETS: HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING, DARK POOLS, AND
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 272-73 (Walter Mattli ed., 2019) (providing evidence from
a U.S. perspective).
176
See supra note 134; see also ESMA, supra note 63, at 128-33 (assessing the
need to establish a centralized cross-market surveillance mechanism at the EU
level).
177
See Yadav, supra note 174 (discussing the supervisory architecture in the
U.S.); see also Busch, supra note 175, at 79 (for a European perspective).
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regulatory fragmentation, malicious actors can find it easier to
camouflage their abusive trading by hiding it in complex strategies
within highly networked global markets.
Overall, it is somewhat questionable whether existing rules on
algorithms and their governance can cope with increasingly
autonomous AI trading agents’ specificities. Tensions in achieving
real transparency and accountability for specific ML methods (e.g.,
deep learning) may arise. At least, de jure, a strong form of
explainability for algorithmic trading systems is required to comply
with financial laws. 178 Importantly, however, compliance with
“strong” explainability requirements creates a trade-off between ML
models’ utmost level of accuracy and possibilities of explanation.179
In other words, the “black box” nature of specific ML methods (e.g.,
deep learning) applied to financial trading can frustrate firms’
ability to comply with financial laws, but this also hampers the safe
and legal implementation of specific AI trading strategies.
However, it should be observed that, de facto, current legal systems
and supervisory arrangements address “strong” AI explainability
only in a limited way (e.g., most compliance exercises rely on selfassessment reports by investment firms and trading venues). In this
context, regulators may face a dangerous trade-off, finding an
optimal balance between technological neutrality and market
integrity.
d. Keep It Closed, but “Fair-ly” White!
The apparently unsurmountable legal problems discussed
above prompt the question of whether the existing liability rules
need upgrading in view of greater AI autonomy and the “black box”
problem. Over recent years, a rich discussion in scholarship and
policymaking worldwide has emerged on a range of legal principles
fit to cope with truly autonomous algorithmic decision-making. For
instance, some commentators propose granting legal personality to
autonomous AI agents, thus rendering the latter directly

178
See Adrien Bibal, Michael Lognoul, Alexandre de Streel & Benoît Frénay,
Legal Requirements on Explainability in Machine Learning, ARTIFICIAL INTEL. & L. 16
(2020) (“[A]s total understanding of the model is required . . . [I]n the case of
financial algorithms.”).
179
Id.
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accountable for their misbehavior.180 Moreover, endowing AI with
legal personality could be complemented by ad-hoc insurance
coverage. 181 On the positive side, such a move would hopefully
empower markets to “internalize” the costs of regulating AI. On the
downside, it could increase moral hazard and even expose markets
to new sources of systemic risks, not to mention all the difficulties
for insurance companies in pricing new and emerging financial
risks.
More extreme approaches would suggest imposing a strict ban
on AI activities, whenever the risks at stake for society outweigh the
related benefits. 182 Others have advocated applying a “strict
liability” rule under tort law for harm caused by AI.183 However,
both proposals do not seem to fit well with the purposes and
rationales of financial market regulation, inspired by principles of
economic freedom, competition, and technological neutrality. 184
Both could indeed impair innovation, thus losing out on several
potential efficiency gains.
It is true that liability rules will likely be unable to deal with the
“black box” nature of specific autonomous AI methods.
Nevertheless, they may still suffice when complemented by sound
regulation addressing algorithmic trading governance. On this last
point, indeed, the challenges brought by AI application in capital
markets have prompted a lively debate on how to leverage the role
of regulation to curb excess risk-taking and moral hazard, while
stimulating innovation at the same time. Many interesting ideas
180
See, e.g., JACOB TURNER, ROBOT RULES: REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
185-86, 197 (2019) (arguing however that there might be the need to set some
minimum criteria for AI personality).
181
Cf. Zetzsche et al., supra note 166, at 35.
182
See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHITE PAPER ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE—A
EUROPEAN APPROACH TO EXCELLENCE AND TRUST 10 (Feb. 19, 2020) [hereinafter
WHITE
PAPER],
COMMISSION
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/commission-white-paper-artificialintelligence-feb2020_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB86-KV24] (quoting the German
Data Ethics Commission’s five-level risk-based regulation system, which envisages
a complete ban for the most dangerous AI applications).
183
See, e.g., Karni A. Chagal-Feferkorn, Am I an Algorithm or a Product? When
Products Liability Should Apply to Algorithmic Decision-Makers, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 61 (2019) (arguing that traditional products liability rules could be applied to
certain AI applications); Bathaee, supra note 84, at 931-32 (discussing the trade-off
between safety and innovation in imposing strict liability rules).
184
See, e.g., Pedro Magalhães Batista & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Dynamism in
Financial Market Regulation: Harnessing Regulatory and Supervisory Technologies, 4
STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 203 (2021) (discussing the need for greater
integration between regulatory technology and supervisory technology).
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have emerged on how to deal with the specificities and additional
risks of AI applications; evaluating them in detail is, however,
beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, in what follows, we
discuss a number of guiding principles for the effective
implementation and use of AI applications, with a view to initiating
a critical policy discourse on this matter.
One frequently debated regulatory approach, which also
leverages existing internal governance frameworks, concerns
keeping a “human-in-the-loop” in all AI decisive processes, in order
to guarantee personal responsibility and accountability. The main
idea is that, by assigning specific roles and responsibility to
individuals alongside the AI supply chain, “traceability” would
alleviate many liability attribution challenges. 185 Positively, this
regulatory option will also entail strengthening current legal
frameworks, without significant and radical law revisions, by
emphasizing AI processes’ transparency and auditability.
Importantly, the “the-human-in-the-loop” approach is also
supported by several recent policy initiatives worldwide. Indeed, it
has been adopted by some “soft law” instruments aimed at guiding
private organizations towards trustworthy implementations of
AI, 186 especially when those imply high-risk decisions. 187 In the

185
E.g., Zetzsche et al., supra note 166, at 38-39, 46-48 (discussing however all
the practical challenges of promoting such an approach).
186
E.g., High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, supra note 38, at
14-20 (proposing seven requirements for trustworthy implementations of AI,
namely: (i) human agency and oversight; (ii) technical robustness and safety; (iii)
privacy and data governance; (iv) transparency; (v) diversity, non-discrimination
and fairness; (vi) societal and environmental wellbeing; (vii) accountability).
187
E.g., COMMISSION WHITE PAPER, supra note 182, at 18-22 (proposing six types
of requirements for high-risk applications of AI, namely: (i) training data; (ii) data
and record-keeping; (iii) information to be provided; (iv) robustness and accuracy;
(v) human oversight; (vi) specific requirements for certain particular AI
applications).
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same vein, financial authorities, 188 self-regulated, 189 and private
organizations alike,190 are all engaged in fostering the AI regulatory
science. Most proposals go into the direction of an enhanced
“precautionary” approach to AI regulation, requiring increased
coordination among different stakeholders.
Notably, public
authorities aim at ensuring trustworthy AI development and
implementation by affirming the relevance of well-designed model
risk management, data governance, and compliance requirements
as the most fundamental AI principles and high regulatory
priorities. In a nutshell, policymakers’ best bet is to create and
promote best practices within the industry to incentivize market
participants to effectively take due care of their algorithms.
In the area of algorithmic market abuse, we have argued that
explaining algorithms’ outcomes and behaviors is a crucial element
in ascertaining and attributing liability for AI wrongdoing. Indeed,
the “black box” nature of specific ML methods that allows for
autonomous trading agents (e.g., DRL) could be interpreted as a
transparency problem. Innovative ideas on how to deal with such
an issue suggest moving from typical “command-and-control” to
embracing more dynamic and flexible approaches, through a
combination of both ex-ante and ex-post regulation, leveraging the

188
In Singapore, the Monetary Authority of Singapore was among the first
authorities to provide a special framework for the development of AI applications
in the financial services industry. See MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, PRINCIPLES
TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS, ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY (FEAT) IN THE
USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND DATA ANALYTICS IN SINGAPORE’S FINANCIAL
SECTOR
(2018),
https://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/News%20and%20Publications/Mono
graphs%20and%20Information%20Papers/FEAT%20Principles%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3UMS-FUZ2]. For an overview of recent regulatory efforts by
financial authorities worldwide, see Zetzsche et al., supra note 166, at 28-34
(reporting on the cases of the European ESAs, De Nederlandsche Bank, and the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority).
189
See, e.g., FINRA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) IN THE SECURITY INDUSTRY
(2020), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/ai-report-061020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RJZ6-FJRL] (highlighting the main factors firms when seeking
to adopt AI applications need to consider, namely: (i) model risk management; (ii)
data governance; (iii) customer privacy; (iv) supervisory control systems; (v)
cybersecurity; (vi) outsourcing and vendor management; (vii) record keeping; and
(viii) workforce structure).
190
MICROSOFT, DEUTSCHE BANK, LINKLATERS, STANDARD CHARTERED & VISA,
FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE: USE CASES FOR IMPLEMENTING RESPONSIBLE AI IN
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
(2019),
https://aka.ms/fromprinciplestopractice
[https://perma.cc/82QJ-PRBA] (implementing Singapore MAS’s FEAT principles
for AI).
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use of regulatory technology to face the new challenges brought by
the evolving complexities of financial technology.191
From an ex-ante perspective, regulators can indeed explore a
wide spectrum of policy options to enhance AI transparency. To
start with, they would need to make important decisions, such as
the scope of codes’ inspection, and to whom supervisory
responsibility should be attributed. While opening an AI “black
box” to inspect model transparency can provide useful information
about a code and its parameters that bridge input with output, this
nevertheless works on the assumption that regulators enjoy some
level of specific domain knowledge. But this is highly debatable.192
On their part, investment firms will be most likely reluctant to
disclose details about their proprietary projects, as they may rightly
fear risks of some leakages to competitors giving rise to IPR and
competition law concerns. 193 Opening the “black box” is per se a
somewhat problematic policy option, as it can ultimately hamper
trust, innovation, and competition.
Instead of aiming for transparency of the models, alternative
views suggest testing AI trading strategies for their possible abusive
tendency under different market conditions before allowing them to
operate in the markets. For instance, this can be done by
institutionalizing more regulated testing frameworks, which are
already contemplated by existing financial laws, as part of a novel
authorization regime for AI.194 Whenever financial authorities are
not well-positioned for such responsibility, the task could be
delegated to a newly established independent third-party
organization, which could arguably better represent and balance all
stakeholders’ legitimate interests. 195 Nevertheless, this policy
option also requires thoughtful considerations regarding the scope
of testing activities, since authorization to use specific AI trading
strategies will be granted as an outcome of testing procedures. In
other words, following authorization, a particular AI trading
191
E.g., Hilary J. Allen, Driverless Finance, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 195-96
(2020); Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Macroeconomic Consequences of Market Manipulation, 83
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 138-40 (2020).
192
Cf. Allen, supra note 191, at 198-99; Zetzsche et al., supra note 166, at 48-49.
193
Iain Sheridan, MiFID II in the Context of Financial Technology and Regulatory
Technology, 12 CAP’L MKTS. L.J. 417, 420 (2017).
194
E.g., Allen, supra note 191, at 196-98.
195
See Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017)
(arguing in favor of the creation of a centralized regulatory agency for the
governance of algorithms).
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strategy will be certified against known forms of market abuse (i.e.,
“good conduct” by design). However, regulators would need to
make important decisions regarding the regulatory framework for
the development of ML methods, including specific arrangements
regulating the role of all individuals involved in the AI supply chain,
as well as the role of training data to be used in simulated scenarios.
In principle, authorization should be calibrated on a risk-based
approach. Depending on the specific case, AI trading systems will
need to be tested according to specific market structures and trading
dynamics to assess the likelihood of them being disruptive. Still,
questions remain on how the tendency of AI to misbehave can be
ascertained, especially for new risks of market manipulation (e.g.,
“aggressive” cross-asset and cross-market trading) and “tacit”
collusion. In fact, regulators would need a framework to clearly
distinguish legitimate trading from unlawful strategies, which
instead have the sole purpose of putting prices under pressure or
triggering other market participants to the same effects without any
justified economic interest.196 Alternatively, for the risks of “tacit”
collusion, a framework would need to determine when an AI
trading agent behaves in a non-competitive manner.197 Ultimately,
the effectiveness of any pre-approval regime through testing is
based on the latter’s ability to uncover AI ability to learn how to
game market rules in simulated environments. Yet there can
arguably be gaps between simulated and real-market environments.
On a positive note, market authorities are themselves engaged in
technological innovation to enhance their oversight capabilities (i.e.,
supervisory technology). Using AI to monitor AI seems indeed a
necessary step to achieve effective supervision. 198 However,
effective supervision and auditability of AI hinge on assumptions
and training data being available for testing purposes. In particular,
196
See, e.g., David C. Donald, Regulating Market Manipulation Through an
Understanding of Price Creation, 6 NTU L. REV. 55 (2011) (arguing that to regulate
market manipulation effectively, regulators need first a clear and proper
understanding of markets and price creation mechanism); see also Matthijs
Nelemans, Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation, 42 VAL. U.L. REV. 1169, 1183
(2008) (arguing that regulators should tackle those trading strategies causing
“unsupported price pressure”).
197
See generally Joseph E. Harrington, Developing Competition Law for Collusion
by Autonomous Artificial Agents, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 331, 356-58 (2018)
(developing a three steps framework to determine the lawfulness of algorithms).
198
Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept
Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L.J. 567, 600-03
(2016); Allen, supra note 191, at 203-05.
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whenever simulated scenarios differ from real use cases, the same
testing procedure may lose significance and have no power to detect
risky AI trading strategies.
Furthermore, ex-post regulatory options can help to ensure exante measures’ effectiveness and, more generally, AI trading
regulation. 199 Ex-post regulatory options should be considered to
enhance AI auditability, not least to address certain self-learning AI
trading methods’ somewhat kaleidoscopic behavior. After all,
regulators and supervisors need to audit algorithms’ behaviors and
their potential harm with respect to market integrity. When looking
at current supervisory mechanisms and infrastructures in place,
however, there are a few reasons to believe that they were
conceptualized for older times, which were characterized by lower
market fragmentation and the presence of less autonomous
algorithms. To remedy this, recent findings from the field of
regulatory technology (“RegTech”) and supervisory technology
(“SupTech”) would suggest leveraging the role of the technology
itself. 200 In highly fragmented, super-fast trading, and mainly
algorithmic global capital markets, there is indeed a need to rethink
our global supervisory architecture to deal with the challenges
brought by algorithmic market abuse, one that ensures cross-market
surveillance. To this end, however, it is doubtful whether trading
venues alone can take on this task, or whether novel public-private
partnerships would be desirable. 201 Arguably, market conduct
authorities could have a more significant role in market surveillance
vis-à-vis private organizations. The latter, because of their legitimate
business interests, could indeed compromise market integrity in the
Allen, supra note 191, at 203.
See, e.g., FINRA, TECHNOLOGY BASED INNOVATIONS FOR REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE (“REGTECH”) IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 2 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2018_RegTech_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66MM-LQLL] (“[M]arket participants are increasingly looking
to use RegTech tools to help them develop more effective, efficient, and risk-based
compliance programs”); DIRK BROEDERS & JERMY PRENIO, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENT,
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (SUPTECH)—THE EXPERIENCE OF
EARLY
USERS
(2018),
https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NW89-HZ5E] (surveying the use of SupTech by a number of
supervisory authority among most advanced jurisdictions).
201
See, e.g., Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang & Cheng-Yun Tsang, RegTech and the New
Era of Financial Regulators: Envisaging More Public-Private-Partnership Models of
Financial Regulators, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 354 (2018) (arguing that financial regulators
would benefit from an enhanced public-private partnership and discussing four
different models for such a collaboration including (i) mixed-ownership RegTech
organization, (ii) contracted RegTech supporter, (iii) a quasi-public RegTech
regulator, and (iv) directly delegated gatekeepers).
199
200
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name of private profits. However, new innovative solutions may
also emerge from the market and further shape the competitive
landscape of the market surveillance business. 202 Moreover,
surveillance mechanisms should also be improved to allow for
“real-time” market conduct supervision, 203 a solution that would
most likely ease enforcement actions against algorithmic market
abuse, but that simultaneously highlights the fundamental
importance of coordination among different stakeholders. 204 To
complement this, reporting arrangements could be strengthened to
provide supervisors with timely information regarding specific
trading strategies used by market participants that employ
sophisticated AI trading systems. 205 Lastly, RegTech could also
bridge supervisors and supervisees more closely and allow for
constant regulatory dialectic.
For instance, some emerging
initiatives have explored the merits and feasibility of introducing
some forms of machine-readable regulation endorsement to
upgrade current regulatory tools.206 By doing so, it is expected that
financial authorities could directly deal with AI trading systems as
they go on markets, without the need for them to always mediate
with AI users.
202
See, e.g., Holly A. Bell, Chapter 10: Using the Market to Manage Proprietary
Algorithmic Trading, in REFRAMING FINANCIAL REGULATION: ENHANCING STABILITY
AND PROTECTING CONSUMERS 266-68 (Hester Piece & Benjamin Klutsey eds., 2016)
(noting the relevance of cooperative market-based solutions to minimize
competition between regulators and market participants on the development of
market structure and surveillance mechanisms).
203
See FINRA, supra note 200, at 4 (“[T]raditional rule-based systems to a
predictive, risk-based surveillance model that identifies and exploits patterns in
data to inform decision-making.”).
204
See, e.g., Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech,
RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
371 (2017) (discussing the potential of “regulatory technology” to enable a close to
real-time and proportionate regulatory regime to balance expected risks and
efficient compliance, also for the case of market manipulation).
205
E.g., Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Legitimate Yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of
Open-Market Manipulation, 68 DUKE L.J. 479, 542-43 (2018).
206
See FINRA, supra note 189, at 9 (confirming that regulators are exploring
and adopting the concept of machine “machine-readable” rulebooks, which could
arguably allow firms to automate regulatory compliance internal processes); see also
Eva Micheler & Anna Whaley, Regulatory Technology: Replacing Law with Computer
Code, 21 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 349, 362-64 (2020) (discussing possible barriers for
the effective implementation of regulatory technology solutions to deliver machinereadable code onto existing IT systems, but also regulatory capture risks for the
future development of regulatory technology projects); Schwalbe, supra note 98, at
599 (suggesting the idea to incorporate legal provisions and constraints into
algorithms themselves, similar to the three Isaac Asimov’s robotics laws).
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To conclude, there is one main takeaway from all of this. When
applying traditional regulatory approaches to the challenges
brought by new financial technologies, the law frequently falls short.
This is precisely the case for increasingly autonomous AI trading
systems (i.e., DRL) and their implications for the reliable
enforcement of market abuse regulations. Crucially, whenever
policymakers attempt to achieve legal simplicity and market
integrity, without hampering innovation, they have reached only
two out of three policy goals at best.207 As this paper has attempted
to demonstrate, market conduct regulators face the same policy
“trilemma” in approaching regulation to deal with increasingly
autonomous AI trading strategies, their “black boxes,” and new
forms of algorithmic market abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
AI trading is an evolutionary step forward in algorithmic
trading techniques. Continuous progress in ML methods applied to
financial trading will pave the way for a new computational finance
paradigm: as we have seen, “deep reinforcement learning” trading
methods will allow for approximating (truly) autonomous AI
trading systems probably evolving into nearly or even truly
autonomous AI trading agents in the long run. While increasingly
autonomous AI agents are proposed to deliver several efficiency
gains for both organizations and markets, their AI agency raises
fundamental ethical and legal questions of liability in cases of
wrongdoing. Our exploratory study has approached these issues
from a financial market conduct perspective. Through a number of
illustrative examples, we have conceptually shown that
autonomous AI trading methods will be able to allow for both old
and new forms of market manipulation, including emerging risks of
algorithmic “tacit” collusion. The above-discussed novel scenarios
of market abuse by autonomous AI trading systems, primarily
elicited by their “black box” nature, pinpoint a number of open
questions. Importantly, established liability rules (e.g., “intent” and
“causation”) do not sufficiently cover instances of autonomous AI
207
See Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, FinTech and the Innovation Trilemma,
107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019) (arguing that to alleviate the trilemma’s effects, regulators
should enhance their institutional arrangements to achieve greater domestic
cooperation and international coordination and rely on more self-regulation by
market actors).
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decision-making. Notably, whenever AI amounts to a “black box,”
liability attribution rules may be subverted. Moreover, existing
enforcement mechanisms, including market surveillance
arrangements, can become outdated as being increasingly unable to
police those forms of market misconduct led by algorithmic agents.
In view of these regulatory shortcomings, we have discussed a
number of policy proposals that have been put forward as to legal
reform, and we develop several guiding principles to inform a
sound policy response. While we remain skeptical as to the realworld effectiveness of any ex-ante screening mechanism, we would
put greater hope in robust governance requirements and ongoing
monitoring arrangements. For the near future, mandating a
“human-in-the-loop” seems the only viable regulatory option, not
least to foster a culture of responsible and safe AI development.
Undoubtedly, as a society, we would prefer avoiding inadequate
and negligent human oversight on risky activities.
Market abuse usually starts as a local phenomenon, a mere
attack to a particular market’s integrity. However, in a globalized
economy, whenever safeguard mechanisms fail to contain the risks,
algorithmic market abuse can also go viral and may spill over to the
whole financial system to the point of threatening its systemic
stability, thus testing the resiliency of our global economy at large.
For all these reasons, the need to rethink our regulatory toolkit is
more than urgent. As this study has attempted to show and
promote, there is a dire need for a change in academic attitude in
favor of more interdisciplinary research and education for better
meeting the complex challenges of financial technology and
innovation in order to develop synergies between the scientific
fields of financial law, economics, and informatics.
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